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INTRODUCTION

In 1896, Justice Harlan dissented against the "separate,
but equal" doctrine established by Plessy v. Ferguson,I saying,
[Iun view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In2 respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
It took the Supreme Court over sixty years to finally overrule
the "separate, but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education,3 but only twenty-one years later in 1975, the Court itself
established another doctrine that downgraded people of Hispanic origin to second-class citizens.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,4 the Supreme Court
sanctioned the use of "apparent Mexican ancestry" as a valid
factor in an inmigration law enforcement officer's analysis on
whether to detain a suspected undocumented immigrant because "[tlhe likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a
relevant factor."5 Through the years, this ethnic classification
has evolved without any explanation in the courts into its current vague and all-encompassing form: "Hispanic appearance. '"6 This unclear and over-generalized ethnic classification
is still widely used today by the United States Border Patrol
7
(USBP) in their immigration investigatory stops and upheld on
a daily basis by federal courts around the country, especially
those courts located in the southern border.
The "Hispanic appearance" classification must raise concerns for all people of Hispanic origin and minority groups
around the country. Both 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and 8 C.F.R. § 278.1
authorize USBP to conduct immigration investigatory stops of
individuals suspected to be aliens within a 100-mile border
zone along the United States border." While most of the immi2

I& at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

3
4

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
422 U.S. 873 (1975).

5
6
7

Id. at 885-87.

See Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
The label of"immigration investigatory stops" throughout the Note refers to
those Terry investigatory stops conducted by USBP officers to question individuals about their immigration status. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
8 With respect to powers of the immigration officers and employees, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (1994) provides:
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without
warrant(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States;

(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the
United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the
territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft,
conveyance or vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles
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gration investigatory stops take place within the southern border, the 100-mile border zone extends the USBP's
authorization to conduct these stops within 100 air miles of the
Canadian border, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, as well
as within the perimeters of Alaska and Hawaii. 9 According to
the American Civil Liberties Union, "[r]oughly two thirds of the
United States population lives within the 100-mile border
zone[,... [tlhat's about 200 million people." 10 As these figures
suggest, USBP officers patrol more than just the border.
Although the USBP's mission of finding and locating undocumented immigrants has been an issue for the agency since
its inception, the recent harsh immigration policies of the
Trump Administration have sparked fear in immigrant communities nationwide. Under the Obama Administration, immigration law enforcement agencies were previously instructed to
prioritize locating and deporting undocumented immigrants
with criminal backgrounds. I' However, the Trump Administration now has issued new guidelines to these agencies that
empower them to "target, detain and deport any of the millions
of immigrants currently in the United States without documentation, including those without past criminal convictions."12 In
addition, some of the Trump Administration's objectives in immigration law enforcement include recruiting 5,000 new USBP

from any such external boundary to have access to private lands,
but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent
illegal entry of aliens into the United States; [and]
(4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed and
which are cognizable under any law of the United States regulating
the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens.
The Attorney General has authorized Border Patrol officers to act as Immigration
officers. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(I) (1974). The "reasonable distance" mentioned in
§ 1357(a)(3) is 100 air miles. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (1999).
9 See Area Search Warrants in BorderZones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara,
84 YALE L.J. 355, 357-58 (1974).
10
The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https: //www.aclu.org/other/constitution- 100-mile-border-zone [https://perma
.cc/74MP-ZAZ6] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). Nine of the ten largest U.S. metropolitan areas fall within the 100-mile border zone: New York City, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego and San Jose.
Id.
11 See Wesley Lowery, Federal Agents Ask Domestic Flight Passengers to
Show IDs in Searchfor Immigrant OrderedDeported, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02/23/federalofflcers-ask-domestic-flight-passengers-to-show-ids-in-search-for-undocumented-immigrant/?utm-term=.3065ccffdc28 [https: //perma.cc/8RNY-LM2D].
12 Id.
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standards1 3 and "[ilncreas[ing]
officers by lowering their hiring
14
northern border security."
On their face, these policies seem to only target undocumented immigrants nationwide. However, the reality is that
immigration law enforcement agencies currently enforce these
policies in a way that also harms U.S. citizens and documented
immigrants from minority groups. 15 Current enforcement of
these immigration policies harms members of minority groups
because of deeply flawed and outdated legal standards-like
the Hispanic appearance classification-that should not persist under today's vastly different circumstances.
There is no better example that illustrates the insidiousness of the enforcement of these flawed and outdated legal
standards than the USBP's immigration investigatory stops on
domestic travelers at the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) pre-boarding screening checkpoints at airports,
typically along the southern border. These immigration investigatory stops occur frequently and are based solely on the
travelers' race and ethnicity, 16 but perhaps most importantly,
See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Vivian Yee
13
& Ron Nixon, To Detain More Immigrants, Trump Administration to Speed Border
2
Hiring, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/1 /us/
trump-immlgration-border-hiring.html [https: //perma.cc/3D8Y-CEXA].
14 Trump Administration Immigration Policy Priorities, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief

ing-statements/trump-administration-imigration-policy-priorities [https://per
ma.cc/GR3D-ESSW].
15
See, e.g., Alvaro Huerta, The 'War on Immigrants': Racist Policies in the
Trump Era, HUFFINGTON POsr (Aug. 7 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/the-war- on-immigrants-racist-policies-in-thetrump us_5980bf68e4b0d187a596909b [https://perma.cc/8TUF-B9S8] (arguing that the immigration policies of the Trump Administration have become highly
"racialized" through the President's rhetoric of "anti-Mexicanism and Islamophobia"); NANCY MORAWETZ, ANNA SCHOENFELDER & NATASHA RIVERA SILBER,
N.Y.U. L. IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC, UNCOVERING USBP: BONUS PROGRAMS FOR UNITED
STATES BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND THE ARREST OF LAWFULLY PRESENT INDIVIDUALS 1
(2013) [hereinafter "UNCOVERING USBP"] ('Those caught in USBP's dragnet include
U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, tourists, student visa-holders and persons with proper authorization to work in the United States.").

16

See, e.g., Jnjoo Lee, Cornel Graduate Students Arrested Near U.S.-Mexico

Border, CORNELL DAILY SUN (Mar. 27, 2013), http://cornellsun.com/2013/0

3

/

2 7

/

cornell-graduate-students-arrested-near-u-s-mexico-border/ [https://perma.cd/
BHV8-UKLJI (describing how two Cornell graduate students were arrested after
they refused to answer a USBP officer's questions at the TSA checkpoint about
their citizenship status at a Texas airport); Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say Border
Patrol Singles Out Too Many Blameless Hispanics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/26/us/some-texans-say-border-patrol-sin3
[https: //perma.cc/
gles-out-too-many-blameless-hispanics.html?mcubz=
KVA3-YXGGj (describing how USBP even stopped and refused to let Cameron
County Judge Gilberto Hinojosa board a plane to Houston until he stated his
citizenship).
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the circumstances under which the USBP conducts these immigration investigatory stops and the legal basis sanctioning
them render the Fourth Amendment's safeguards of domestic
travelers ineffective. 17
TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints usually follow the
same security procedures in every airport in the United
States.' 8 Travelers wait in line with their carry-on luggage
along corridors formed by retractable belt stanchions to be
called by TSA officers at their podiums. 19 Once at the podiums,
travelers must show a form of identification and their airline
tickets to the TSA officer before proceeding to the conveyor belt,
where travelers place their belongings-including their shoesand proceed to an x-ray scanner. 2 0 After successfully passing
through these security procedures, travelers proceed to a
boarding gate and board their flight. 2 1 However, some airports
located near the U.S.-Mexico border are different from other
airports around the country in that USBP officers are stationed
at these TSA checkpoints. 2 2 Officers position themselves between the TSA podiums and the conveyor belt, and they take
advantage of the compulsory circumstances of the TSA checkpoint environment to conduct their own "random" immigration
investigatory stops on unsuspecting travelers. 23 With an upcoming surge in recruitment for USBP officers and a harsher
enforcement of these immigration policies, 2 4 potentially all airports in most major U.S. cities within the 100-mile border zone
will have USBP officers stationed at their TSA pre-boarding
screening checkpoints, who will be authorized to arbitrarily
stop and harass millions under the pretext of border security.
This Note argues that USBP immigration investigatory
stops conducted in TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints at
airports in the southern border are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and that the current standard for USBP to
conduct an immigration investigatory stop is antiquated and
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Part I briefly discusses
See infra Parts III and IV.
See, e.g., JBG TRAVELS, 3046 Going Through TSA Security Check Point,
YoUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watchv=t7fBqju2GJY
[https://perma.cc/MM27-TAWX] (depicting the TSA security screening process at
an airport in Milwaukee).
19
ICL
20
Id.
17
18

21

22

Id.

See Yardley, supra note 16 ("[USBP] [algents are posted in the airport and
bus station and along highways ...
23 See infra Part III.
24 See Yee & Nixon, supra note 13.
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the history of the USBP and its focus on Mexican and Hispanic
immigrants. Part II examines law enforcement's application of
the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable suspicion standard, focusing on its application in the context of immigration
law enforcement and each of the different types of immigration
investigatory stops delineated by the Supreme Court. Part III
examines the legal standards sanctioning TSA pre-boarding
screening checkpoints and describes how USBP details conduct immigration investigatory stops in these checkpoints.
Part IV argues that the USBP's immigration investigatory stops
at TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because of the compulsory conditions of the TSA checkpoint and the manner by which USBP
officers conduct these stops. Finally, Part V argues that the
Hispanic appearance classification in the current reasonable
suspicion standard to stop suspected undocumented immigrants violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause because it is not narrowly tailored to further border
security and reduce overall illegal imnigration.
I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL
AND ITS IMPACT IN THE SOUTHERN BORDER

A. The Early Beginnings of the United States Border
Patrol
The USBP was formed in 1924 to enforce U.S. immigration
restrictions by patrolling the borderland regions to prevent unauthorized border crossings and arresting people defined as
unauthorized immigrants by the Immigration Act of 1917.25
Most of the USBP's first members were part of the Anglo-American working class who had all grown up in the southern bor2 6 In the
derlands and with white violence against Mexicans.
early days, although the agency's migration control mandate
came from Washington, D.C., the USBP started as a decentralized outfit with practices and priorities that were "primarily
local creations." 2 7 The decentralized practices of the agency's
outfits and the broad migration control mandate gave the
by disorganization and an overUSBP a rough start "defined
28
clarity."
arching lack of
25

8 U.S.C. § 142-155 (1917); KELLY LYrLE HERNANDEZ, MIGRAI A HISTORY OF THE

U.S. BORDER PATROL 1-2 (2010).

26

LYTLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 42-43.

27

Id. at 8.

28

Id. at 34.
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Just one year later, USBP officers already had a broad
authority to interrogate, detain, and arrest any person they
suspected of committing a violation of U.S. immigration law. In
1925, Congress enacted legislation establishing the USBP's law
enforcement authority, which invested USBP officers with
broad powers of arrest without a warrant of suspected aliens
entering or attempting to enter the country in violation of immigration law.29 Although initially restricted to the borderlands, 30 court holdings helped extend the USBP's authority to
conduct arrests without a warrant beyond the border crossings
and into the interior of the country. For instance, in Lew Moy
v. United States,3 1 the Eighth Circuit held that the consummation of a conspiracy to bring undocumented immigrants does
not take place at the illegal border crossing, but until the undocumented immigrants reach their destination in the interior
of the country. 3 2 Through this interpretation of illegal immigration, the holding gave the early USBP mandate an undefined massive jurisdiction to work on around the country. 3 3
Consequently, USBP officers started patrolling backcountry
trails, conducting traffic stops on major borderland roadways,
and conducting warrantless arrests of suspected aliens beyond
the borderlines and into the greater borderlands region. 3 4
B.

The United States Border Patrol's Focus on Mexican
Immigrants

The USBP's focus on targeting Mexican immigrants first
began during the 1920s, when population figures for border
communities with people of Mexican descent were compared to
the government's estimates of unsanctioned border crossers
that had evaded the USBP. 3 5 Any estimates of growth in these
Mexican communities were attributed to illegal immigration,
and therefore, government agencies concluded that no other
29
Id. at 35 ("[USBP] officer[s] [were] authorized to 'arrest any alien who in his
presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of
any law or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admission of
aliens, and to take such alien Immediately for examination before an immigrant
inspector or other official having authority to examine aliens as to their rights to
admission to the United [SItates.'").
30 See id.
31
237 F. 50 (8th Cir. 1916).
32 Id. at 52 ("Successfully to consummate the unlawful introduction of the
prohibited aliens required more than the mere bringing of them across the line. It
was necessary to evade the immigration officials by transporting them into the
interior and concealing their identity.").

33

LYTLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 35.

34
35

Id. at 46.

Id.
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group but Mexican nationals in the southern border had been
36
engaging in unauthorized border crossings in the region.
This narrow enforcement of immigration laws in the borderland
regions, sanctioned by the government in Washington, linked
illegal immigration directly to Mexicans and people of Mexican
descent. 3 7 As USBP officers were pulled back from the borderline to start patrolling the greater borderland regions, they
started questioning hundreds of thousands of local people,
broadly policing Mexican mobility rather than patrolling 3 8the
political boundary between the United States and Mexico.
As a result of the agency's link between illegal immigration
and Mexican descent, the USBP started using race and ethnicity as an indicator of illegal entry or the individual's immigration status.3 9 USBP officers would use the stereotypical profile
of the "Mexican Brown"-"about 5'5" to 5'8"; dark brown hair;
brown eyes; dark complexion"-to detain individuals and inquire about their immigration status. 40 Ironically, many Mexican immigrants were actually "white and even blue-eyed" and
did not fit with this stereotypical profile given their mixed-race
41
roots because of their Native American and European origins.
USBP also used the profile of "Mexican Brown" as an excuse to
enforce their other border responsibilities, like smuggling and
contraband, both activities that intersected with undocumented immigration. 4 2 USBP Chief Inspectors and Commissioners continuously upheld the USBP officers' use of race and
ethnicity while reviewing cases involving people of Mexican descent-even in those cases which, according to Chief Inspector
Chester C. Courtney from the El Paso Station in 1927, would
searches "[hiad the
have been thrown out on account of 4illegal
3
... persons been white Americans."

36

37
38
39
40

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

50.

46.
48.
10.

Id. at 30. Social class was also a factor behind the stereotype of "Mexican
Brown." In the highly racialized social organization of the South, middle-class
people of Mexican descent were described as "Spanish" or "Spanish American"
and were considered equals among whites, while, in contrast, lower-class people
like Mexican laborers were poor, were dark-skinned, and did not speak English.
Id. at 30, 42-43.
See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Proce42
dure, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1543, 1585 (2011).
43
LYRLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 48.
41

1410
C.
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The United States Border Patrol Today

By the 1960s, the USBP had become a complex law enforcement agency with a massive infrastructure built around
the focus of illegal immigration in the southern border. 4 4
Training for the officers in immigration law enforcement also
improved, but the practice of using the "Mexican Brown" profile
was still in use and deeply rooted in the practices of USBP. 4 5
For USBP officers, "any connection between whiteness and illegal[] [immigration]" was laughable, and as one officer is quoted
saying:
[Ajfter 13 years of doing this, I can't really describe, it's a gut
feeling, a hunch. I can walk downtown El Paso and walk by a
lot of people and know they are legal... [and] all of a sudden,
one will be by me or passing in front of me, that I just know
46
doesn't have documents.
Meanwhile, statistics showed that there was a drop in the number of apprehensions of undocumented immigrants. 4 7
Then, in July 1960, Edgar C. Niehbur-the assistant chief
of USBP at the time-researched birth and immigration records
from people of Mexican origin in the borderland states, and
according to his research, he found that many people claiming
to be U.S. citizens were actually false claimants, and thereby
"fraudulent citizens." 4 8 Niehbur's purported findings provided
an explanation for the drop in the number of apprehensions of
undocumented immigrants, reflecting how "illegals who once
swam, climbed, and hiked across the border" were now avoiding detection under the cover of fraudulent documents. 4 9 By
1964, all USBP officers were trained in analyzing and identifying fraudulent documents and were instructed to "find the
frauds who were hiding among the citizens and legal immigrants," intensifying the link between illegality and Mexican
origin.5 0 Toward the 1980s and '90s, Mexican-American comId. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199-201.
Id. at 203-04.
Id. According to Niehbur, "one in four filings for birth certificates between
May of 1954 and April of 1957 were fraudulent claims to American birth or
citizenship. Considering that between 1940 and 1960 the state of Texas issued
one hundred and ninety thousand birth certificates to persons of Mexican origin,
44
45
46
47
48

[he] argued that a considerable number of persons ... were actually ... fraudu-

lent citizens." Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 204. This issue continues to this day, as passport applicants with
official U.S. birth certificates-most, if not all, Hispanic-are being jailed in immigration centers and entered into deportation proceedings after being accused of
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munity leaders began to complain about the continuous USBP
practices of harassing Mexican-Americans and legal immigrants in business districts and residential areas within border
51
cities.
After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in 2003, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, all the immigration-related functions performed
by the INS were transferred to three new agencies under the
command of the DHS: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) (the head branch of the USBP), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service (USCIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).5 2 By 2014, USBP had over 21,000
officers, almost all of them along the U.S.-Mexico border.5 3 Although the number of USBP officers along the U.S.-Canada
border has historically been more limited, the current "Mexicanization" of the northern border has driven security anxieties
of the USBP and led the agency to increase the number of
officers from a few hundred in the 1990s to over 2,200 in
2014.

54

II
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN IMMIGRATION
LAw ENFORCEMENT

A.

The Fourth Amendment and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect

In 1891, Justice Gray wrote about the Fourth Amendment
that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." 5 5 The Fourth Amendment protects

people from unreasonable searches and seizures and estabusing fraudulent birth certificates since they were born. See Kevin Sieff, U.S. Is
Denying Passports to Americans Along the Border, Throwing Their Citizenship into
Question, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

the americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwingtheir-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1 d630e84-aOda- 11 e8-a3dd-2a 19
91 f075d5_story.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.9e9c73 1ee8aa [http://perma
.cc/W5AD-V6NY]. Even a current state prison guard who was a former service
member and also a USBP agent was denied a U.S. passport and accused of using
a fraudulent birth certificate. Id.
51 LYrLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 228.
52 Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REv. 1, 11 (2014).
53
54

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.

55

Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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lishes that no warrants shall issue unless supported by oath or
56
affirmation setting forth facts that establish probable cause.
Accordingly, courts have reasoned that warrantless searches
and seizures are reasonable as long as they are supported by
probable cause. 5 7 The probable cause requirement is fulfilled
when "'facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed."58
All arrests are seizures, but not all seizures are arrests.
Brief detentions short of traditional arrest are deemed
seizures. 5 9 Law enforcement officers effectively seize people
whenever the officers accost individuals and restrain their freedom to walk away. 6 0 The Supreme Court's decision in Terry v.
Ohio created a less stringent standard than probable cause for
temporary investigatory seizures and patdowns called "reasonable suspicion." 6 1 This new standard requires only that "[law
enforcement] officer[s] observe[ I unusual conduct which leads
[them] reasonably to conclude in light of [their] experience that
criminal activity may be afoot."6 2 Whether officers have developed sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct these investi63
gatory stops depends on the totality of the circumstances.
When assessing individuals, trained and experienced law enforcement officers make objective observations and consider
the modes or patterns of certain lawbreakers, which lead the
officers to draw inferences and make deductions that might not
be discerned by the untrained or inexperienced individual. 64
However, when a "stop is not based on objective criteria, the
risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable
limits."65
56

U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The protections of the Fourth Amendment are

enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because they are "implicit In 'the concept of ordered liberty.'" Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
57
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
58 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (alterations in
original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
59 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment is implicated even when an officer's conduct falls short of a "technical
arrest" or a "full-blown search").
60
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
61 See id. at 26-27.
62
Id. at 30.
63 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
64
Id.
65
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
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Although probable cause is more stringent than reasonable suspicion, both standards deal with probabilities and not
hard certainties. 6 6 Given other facts observed, whenever law
enforcement officers notice any additional relevant facts that
increase the likelihood that an individual has committed, is
committing, or will be committing a crime, then they develop
sufficient probable cause or reasonable suspicion to perform a
seizure. 6 7 Therefore, probability acts as a constraint in the
totality of circumstances analysis, as law enforcement is forced
to separate those facts that contribute to the likelihood of criminal conduct from those that do not. 6 8 The calculations of
these probabilities are neither mathematical nor technical, but
rather are factual and practical considerations that are "commonsense" to trained and experienced law enforcement officers. 6 9 For example, a police officer might observe a person
running down the street and make no inference from that fact
alone. However, if the police officer had previously heard on
dispatch that someone was mugged in the street from where
the running person came from, then the likelihood that the
running person was involved in the mugging increases.
The combinations of facts that can increase the likelihood
that an individual has committed, is committing, or will commit a crime are unlimited. Law enforcement officers conduct
investigatory stops by relying on their observations of the individual's characteristics and conduct and of the environment
where they observe the individual. 70 However, the reasonable
suspicion standard is supposed to consider the totality of these
observed circumstances objectively, but it is only through the
individual law enforcement officer's mental process that these
circumstances are analyzed, and thereby, the totality of the
circumstances test constantly runs the risk of becoming subjective.71 The main problem with the standard becoming more
subjective is that a law enforcement officer's suspicion may be
impacted by the officer's own bias or misperception-whether
conscious or unconscious-and not necessarily by enhanced
intuition obtained through police training or experience. 72 For
66 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
67 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect 93
YALE L.J. 214, 217 (1983).
68 See id.
69 See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
70 See Johnson, supra note 67, at 218.
71
See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
72 See Andrew Jay Flame, Criminal Procedure-Drug Courier Profiles and
Terry-Type Seizures-United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991), 65 TEMP. L. REv. 323, 336-37 (1992).
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instance, a white law enforcement officer might describe in
court an otherwise normal behavior of a Hispanic individual as
a "furtive gesture," which might only be a misconstruction
probably originating from the cultural differences between the
officer and the individual. 7 3 Indeed, this oversight of the standard sometimes gives way to "permissible" racial profiling of
suspects.
Furthermore, the deference that courts give law enforcement officers in the reasonable suspicion analysis exacerbates
the problem of the standard becoming subjective. When officers need to justify an investigatory stop that may be borderline unreasonable, they may do so by either "reciting
characteristics that [they] know[ I the court will accept . . . [or
by] fabricat[ing] characteristics in order to meet the reasonable
suspicion standard. " 7 4 This issue is constantly raised in drug
courier cases, where law enforcement officers stationed at airports watch for travelers matching the "drug courier profile": a
set of characteristics and behaviors which officers, based on
their collective experience, have identified as typical of people
carrying illicit drugs. 75 Some courts have recognized that the
"drug courier" profile characteristics are often difficult to distinguish from "reasonable innocent behavior" and that officers
tend to classify their suspects' conduct and demeanor as "nervous," "brisk[ I," or "furtive[ I" in order to fit them within the
76
profile's characteristics and justify their stop.

For instance, in United States v. Lopez,7 7 two USBP agents
stopped a vehicle because they became suspicious after the
driver avoided eye contact with them. 7 8 In Lopez, the Fifth
Circuit explained that in a previous case, it held that the appellant glancing repeatedly and nervously at a USBP agent was a

79
Now,
valid factor raising the agent's suspicion of wrongdoing.

in Lopez, the government was asking the Fifth Circuit to find
that a driver's failure to look at the USBP officers was also a
valid factor raising an agent's suspicion of wrongdoing. 8 0 The
court explained that by holding that both factors were valid in
73
See Johnson, supra note 67, at 239.
74
See Flame, supra note 72, at 336-37.
75 Id. at 323 n.7.
76 See United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Garvin, 576 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 n.1 (N.D. In. 1983); United States v.
Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
77
564 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1977).
78 Id. at 711.
79 United States v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1977).
See Lopez, 564 F.2d at 712.
80
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the reasonable suspicion analysis, all drivers would be placed
in "a most precarious position."1 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
held that where a reasonable suspicion factor and its opposite
can both be used by law enforcement officers to justify stopping
82
an individual, then both factors lose their probative value.
These flaws in the reasonable suspicion standard are only compounded when law enforcement officers are allowed to use race
and ethnicity as a valid supporting factor in their decision to
detain a suspect, especially in the context of immigration law
83
enforcement, as the next section will explain.
B.

The Decision to Detain a Suspect in the Context of
Immigration Law Enforcement

Immigration law enforcement agencies derive their authority from the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes
them to exercise certain powers without a warrant. 8 4 Immigration officers have broad interrogation powers that authorize
them to interrogate, without a warrant, any aliens or people
8 5 Imthey believe to be aliens as to their immigration status.
migration officers also have broad search powers that authorize
them to board and search "any vessel[,] ... railway car, aircraft,
conveyance, or vehicle . . . for the purpose of patrolling the
border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens."8 6 Yet, these broad
interrogation and search powers can only be exercised "within
a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the
United States,"8 7 which the United States Attorney General defined to be 100-air miles. 8 8 However, the Supreme Court has
defined the scope and limits of these powers according to three
different situations and their particular circumstances.
81

Id.

82

See id. at 712-13.

Another huge issue is raised when law enforcement is allowed to use race
or ethnicity as a valid factor raising reasonable suspicion: pretext to conduct a
stop. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[The Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis.").
84
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1994).
85 Id. § 1357(a)(1).
86
Id. § 1357(a)(3).
87
Id.
88 See 8 C.F.R_ § 287.1 (1999).
83
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InternationalPorts of Entry and Functional
Equivalents of the Border

The first situation involves border crossings at international ports of entry. Inmigration law enforcement officers are
not required to have a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion when conducting stops of individuals, vehicles, and
conveyances at the border or at international port of entries
because these stops are considered to be "reasonable" since
"the person or item . . . entered into our country from
outside."8 9 According to the Supreme Court, this border
search exception "is grounded in the recognized right of the
sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed
by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country." 90
Congress recognized this right of the sovereign and extended
the Executive branch "plenary authority to conduct routine
searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or
a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to
prevent the introduction of contraband into this country." 9 1
Furthermore, whenever considering any balancing test, the
"Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted
persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border"9 2 and therefore, "the expectation of privacy is less at the
93
border than it is in the interior."
Yet the Supreme Court has held that different legal standards apply for detentions of property and individuals when
these detentions go beyond the scope of routine border
searches. In United States v. Flores-Montano,9 4 the Court upheld the search of a vehicle in which the border authorities
disassembled it and removed its gas tank, seizing thirty-seven
kilograms of marijuana as a result. 9 5 The Court's reasoning
was that the interference with the possessory interest in a vehicle crossing the border into the country is justified by the "Gov96
ernment's paramount interest in protecting the border."
9 7 the
However, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
Court did require officers to have reasonable suspicion of posSee United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
89
90 Id. at 620.
91
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-17).
92
See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
93 Id. at 154.
94

Id.

95
96
97

Id. at 150.
Id. at 155.
473 U.S. 531 (1985).

at 149.
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sible drug smuggling whenever the detention of travelers at the
border "[goes] beyond the scope of a routine customs search
and inspection."98 Montoya de Hernandez involved the detention of a traveler who had arrived at the Los Angeles International Airport from a flight that departed from Colombia and
aroused the suspicion of customs officials for being a drug
smuggler. 9 9 Although her traveling documents were in order,
the officials were suspicious of the traveler's peculiar answers
to their questions about her trip, for which they conducted a
patdown and strip search that eventually led to the discovery of
balloons containing cocaine hidden in her alimentary canal. 10 0
Therefore, even at the border, officials are required to have
reasonable suspicion for those prolonged detentions that are
more intrusive in nature for individuals than the routine detentions that are expected in the border.
Montoya de Hernandez also shows another important aspect of the border search exception: the exception also applies
to the "functional equivalents" of the border. 10 1 The Supreme
Court has held that "functional equivalents" of the border can
include: (1) stations near the border at a point marking the
confluence of two or more roads that extend from the borderwhich can be both permanent and temporary-and (2) stations
in airports located inside the country where incoming international flights arrive after a nonstop flight from a foreign country. 10 2 But the Court did not enumerate a list of factors to
determine what stations were "functional equivalents" of the
border, except for holding that a roving patrol did not fall
within the definition. 10 3 The lack of clarity on what stations fit
the classification of a "functional equivalent" of the border has
frustrated lower courts in their attempts to classify the different kinds of stations-including domestic fixed checkpoints' 04 -in their controlling districts.
For instance, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are split on what
circumstances make an interior checkpoint a "functional
98

Id. at 541.

99

Id.

at 533-34.

100

Id. at 534-36.
101
See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
102
IcL It is important to note that the Court in Almeida-Sanchez did not hold
that any airport inside the country and its installations as a whole where nonstop
international flights arrive is a functional equivalent of the border. The Court only
established that the "passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving" at an interior

airport are within the functional equivalent of a border search.
103
104

Id.

See infra II.B.2.
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equivalent" of the border. In United States v. Jackson,1 0 5 the
Fifth Circuit held that for an interior checkpoint to fit the classification of functional equivalent of the border, "the government must demonstrate with 'reasonable certainty' that the
traffic passing through the checkpoint is 'international' in
character."' 10 6 In contrast, in United States v. Bowen, 10 7 the
Ninth Circuit held that if the interior checkpoint was "at a
location where virtually everyone searched has just come from
the other side of the border, [then] the [interior checkpoint] is a
functional equivalent of a border search."' 10 8 Although both
circuit courts set different standards, both had the same rationale in mind. The Fifth Circuit explained that the purpose of
the reasonable certainty standard is to limit the functional
equivalents of the border to "intercept no more than a negligible
number of domestic travelers." 10 9 Like the Fifth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit explained that the purpose was to limit functional equivalents of the border from intercepting "a significant
number of ... domestic travelers going from one point to another within the United States." 1 10 Moreover, both circuit
courts agree that if any interior checkpoint oversteps this limitation, then they lose their classification as functional
equivalents of the border."'
Finally, it is important to note that since circuit courts
have different standards for classifying stations or interior
checkpoints as functional equivalents of the border, this fact
means that not all stations or interior checkpoints are functional equivalents of the border. Furthermore, this fact also
means that those stations and interior checkpoints that have
been classified by courts to be functional equivalents of the
border might lose their classification depending on the nature
of the traffic crossing these checkpoints. In fact, in Jackson,
the Fifth Circuit was not only changing its standard for functional border equivalency, but also changing the classification
of the Sierra Blanca checkpoint located in

Texas.

1 12

Ulti-

mately, these classifications are subject to change depending
on the district's population in which the checkpoints are located, and therefore, the larger the concentration of domestic
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

112

825 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 860 (emphasis added).
500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), affd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
Id. at 965 (emphasis added).
See Jackson, 825 F.2d at 860.
See Bowen, 500 F.2d at 965.
See id.; Jackson, 825 F.2d at 859-60.
See Jackson, 825 F.2d at 854.
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travelers crossing these checkpoints, the more likely courts will
avoid classifying them as functional equivalents of the border.
2.

Domestic Fixed Checkpoints

As explained briefly above, the second situation involves
domestic fixed checkpoints in the interior of the country. Immigration law enforcement agencies conduct surveillance in
two types of checkpoints: "[plermanent checkpoints . ..

main-

tained at certain nodal intersections" and "temporary checkpoints [that] are established from time to time at various
places." 1 13 These interior checkpoints were implemented by
immigration law enforcement agencies, specifically USBP, to
contain the flow of undocumented immigrants within the districts closest to the border 1 4 because "[o]nce the illegal alien
gets settled in a big city far away from the border it becomes
very difficult to apprehend him." 115 Their primary purpose is
"to intercept vehicles or conveyances transporting illegal aliens,
or nonresident aliens admitted with temporary border passing
cards." 1 6 Therefore, USBP selects the locations for permanent
checkpoints based on the following set of factors:
1. A location on a highway just beyond the confluence of two
or more roads from the border, in order to permit the checking of a large volume of traffic with a minimum number of
officers. This also avoids the inconvenience of repeated
checking of commuter or urban traffic which would occur if
the sites were operated on the network of roads leading from
and through the more populated areas near the border.
2. Terrain and topography that restrict passage of vehicles
around the checkpoint, such as mountains ....
3. Safety factors: an unobstructed view of oncoming traffic,
to provide a safe distance for slowing and stopping; parking
space off the highway; power source to illuminate control
signs and inspection area, and bypass capability for vehicles
not requiring examination.
[Tlhe checkpoints, as a general rule, are located at a
4....
control the unlawthe 25 mile zone in order to
beyond
point
7
ful movement inland of such visitors. 1
USBP uses the same factors when selecting locations for their
temporary checkpoints, although the two distinguishing factors between permanent and temporary checkpoints are that
113
114
115

See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).
See United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
Id. at 405.

116

IJL
IdL

117
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temporary checkpoints are located on roads where traffic is
less frequent and that they are "set up at irregular intervals
and intermittently so as to confuse the potential violator." 1 18
Finally, these domestic fixed checkpoints have similar accouterments, like warning signs ahead of the checkpoints indicating their existence and informing travelers crossing the
checkpoint of the officials' authority and that they may be
stopped for a limited inquiry. 119
The Supreme Court has also set different standards for
stops and searches of vehicles crossing through these checkpoints. In United States v. Ortiz,120 the Court held that USBP
cannot, in the absence of consent or probable cause, search
vehicles at these interior checkpoints and the functional
equivalents of the border. 121 The Court's reasoning was based
on the notion that "a search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy.'

122

However, for immigration in-

vestigatory stops, the Court held in United States v. MartinezFuerte123 that USBP officers at these checkpoints and at functional equivalents of the border 1 2 4 were able to conduct immigration investigatory stops, including referrals to a secondary
inspection area for a limited nonintrusive inquiry, without a
warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. 1 2 5 The
Court's reasoning in Martinez-Fuertewas that requiring these
stops to be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical to enforce due to the heavy flow of traffic and because it
would not effectively deter the "well-disguised" operations of
smugglers and undocumented immigrants traveling to the in26
terior of the country. 1

Furthermore, the Court held in Martinez-Fuertethat these
investigatory stops were not intrusive searches because "[aill
that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a
brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States"-although
118

119
120
121
122

123
124

Id.
I& at 407.
422 U.S. 891 (1975).
Id. at 896-97.
Id. at 896.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
It is important to note that Martinez-F'uertedid not hold that these domes-

tic fixed checkpoints are functional equivalents of the border. The Supreme Court
has not offered any guidance on how to classify what checkpoints can be functional equivalents of the border, and therefore the circuit courts are currently split
on the factors supporting such a classification. See supra Part II.B. 1.
125
See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 562-64.
126

Id. at 557.
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27
the Court did not explain which documents could prove this. 1

The Court also explained that these checkpoints are less intrusive and frightening than roving patrols because "motorist[s]
can see that other vehicles are being stopped, [they] can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and [they are] much less
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." 128 Moreover, the Court explained that these checkpoints have: (1) minimum potential interference with legitimate traffic because
"[mlotorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as
they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of these
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere;" and (2) a regularized manner of operations that "appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity" and is
"reassuring to law-abiding motorists[ ] that the stops are duly
29
authorized and believed to serve the public interest." 1 Consequently, the Court concluded that with these considerations in
place, it was unlikely for USBP officials to locate a domestic
fixed checkpoint "where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on
motorists as a class."'1 30
Finally, the Court in Martinez-Fuerteheld that neither type
of checkpoint requires prior authorization by warrant because
the reasonableness of their stops depends on factors like the
location of the checkpoints and the methods used in their operation. 131 Therefore, this last holding in Martinez-Fuerteallows
the review of the stops conducted by USBP at these check32
points based on the factors listed previously in the opinion. 1
3.

Roving Patrols

Lastly, the third situation occurs during roving patrolswhenever immigration law enforcement officers stop a moving
vehicle already inside the United States to question the occupants about their citizenship. 133 In United States v. BrignoniPonce,13 4 the Supreme Court held that the standard of reasonable suspicion applies whenever officers conduct roving patrols, holding that "officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
127
(1975)).
Id.
128
Id. at 559.
129
130 Id.
131 I& at 565.
132
Id. at 565-66.
133 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975).
134
Id at 873.
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rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally
in the country." 13 5 The Court found that requiring reasonable
suspicion for these stops "allows the Government adequate
means of guarding the public interest and also protects residents of the border areas from indiscriminate official interference" and concluded that it is not "'reasonable' under the
Fourth Amendment to make such stops on a random basis."13 6
The holding in Brignoni-Ponce also provided immigration
law enforcement agencies with a set of valid factors in the reasonable suspicion standard to consider in their decision to stop
a vehicle for purposes of immigration law enforcement. 1 3 7
Among these include: (1) "characteristics of the area in which
they encounter a vehicle" (proximity to the border, patterns of
traffic, and previous experience with alien traffic); (2) "information about recent illegal border crossings in the area"; (3) "[tlhe
driver's behavior" (erratic driving or attempts to evade officers);
(4) "[alspects of the vehicle itself' (certain vehicles with large
compartments may be used for transporting concealed aliens,
the appearance that the vehicle might be heavily loaded, or the
extraordinary number of passengers); and, most importantly,
8
(5) an individual's "apparent Mexican ancestry." 13
Although the Court made clear that conducting an investigatory stop solely relying on the "apparent Mexican ancestry" of
those individuals stopped would neither justify a reasonable
belief that they were aliens or were concealing other aliens
illegally in the country, it nevertheless allowed ethnicity to be a
valid factor in the reasonable suspicion standard. 139 To supIcL at 884.
Id. at 883.
137 Id. at 884-85.
138
I& at 884-86. Another one of the holdings in Martinez-Fuerte was that
even if referrals to secondary inspection by USBP officers in domestic fixed checkpoints were largely based on an individual's "Mexican appearance," the use of race
and ethnicity did not violate the Constitution. The Court reasoned that these
types of intrusions (stops and secondary inspections) are sufficiently minimal
when used in a combination to the other factors delineated by the Court in its
opinion in Martinez-Futerte. See supra Part II.B.2. However, as this Note argues,
the use of race and ethnicity through the "Hispanic appearance" factor does
violate the Constitution. See infra Part V.
139
See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885. Allowing immigration law enforcement to use race or ethnicity in the reasonable suspicion standard allows officers
to use federal immigration enforcement as a pretext for investigating other crimes,
like drug distribution or possession, even If the basis for the immigration "crime"
was weak. See Carbado & Harris, supra note 42, at 1585; see also Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that a police officer's subjective
intentions to conduct a stop play no role in Fourth Amendment analysis as long
as the stop was supported objectively).
135
136
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port this holding, the Court cited population statistics from the
southern-border states of people of Mexican origin and those
registered as aliens, 140 and concluded that "[tlhe likelihood
that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high
14 1
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor."
Moreover, the Court endorsed the Government's assertion that
trained immigration law enforcement officers "can recognize
the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico,
14 2
relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut."'
The "apparent Mexican ancestry" factor in Brignoni-Ponce
has transformed over the years in the courts. First, the standard set by the Court in Brignoni-Ponceonly applied to vehicles,
but was later extended to pedestrian stops by the Seventh Circuit. 143 Then, the term "apparent Mexican ancestry" evolved

into "Mexican appearance,"' 4 4 later equated first to "Latin extraction,"'14 5 and then to the term used today by the majority of
the courts: "Hispanic appearance." 1 4 6 However, neither the
courts nor immigration law enforcement agencies have ever
explained why these terms have been equated or whether officers are trained or experienced enough to distinguish between
them. To this day, the Ninth Circuit has been the only court to
recognize that "Hispanic appearance," just like any other factor
in the reasonable suspicion standard, loses its probative value
as it is "likely to sweep many ordinary citizens into a generality

140 See Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 886 n.12.
141 Id. at 886.
142 Id. at 885. The Court cited the Reply Brief for the United States in the case
United States v. Ortiz where the Government asserted the following:
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has informed us that
experienced Border Patrol officers look for persons with the characteristic appearance of Mexican residents an appearance that distinguishes those persons from the thousands of Mexican aliens who
lawfully reside in this country and the thousands of American citizens of Mexican ancestry. Illegal Mexican entrants commonly appear thin, their hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in
a characteristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in full-cut
and coarsely-woven material. Experience has shown we are told,
that illegal entrants may exhibit obvious nervousness or affect excessive nonchalance as they approach a checkpoint.
Reply Brief for the United States, United States v. Ortlz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (No.
73-2050), 1975 WL 184933, at *12-*13.
143 See Ill. Migrant Council v. Piliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976)
(holding that "Mexican appearance" alone did not provide the basis for reasonable
suspicion in pedestrian stops).
144 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 571 (1976).
145 See United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d 1160, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979).
146 See Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
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of suspicious appearance," 14 7 and therefore, has found that
"Hispanic appearance" is, in general, of such little probative
value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify an
48
investigatory stop. 1
Considering these three types of immigration investigatory
stops, this next section of the Note will now describe how stops
are conducted at the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints.
The section that follows it will then argue that the stops conducted at TSA checkpoints closely match and resemble roving
patrol stops because of the surrounding circumstances behind
them.
III
How USBP

IMMIGRATION INVESTIGATORY STOPS AT

TSA

CHECKPOINTS ARE UNIQUE

A.

The Airport Environment and TSA Checkpoints

Since September 11, 2001, airport security has become
more than ever a primary concern for Congress and the Executive branch. In reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November 2001.149 The Act established the TSA and gave the agency

the responsibility of "detecting and thwarting potential terrorists" through the use of pre-boarding screening procedures
at all U.S. airports. 1 50 In fact, by statute, the Under Secretary
of the TSA requires airports to refuse transporting travelers
who are not subjected to a search that is intended to detect if
they are carrying or concealing "a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance."' 1
147
See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992)).
148
Id. at 1135; see also Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 463-64
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Montero-Camargowith approval, and noting that it would
be particularly inappropriate to extend its statistical rationale to circumstances
involving the seizure of persons of Arab ancestry at an airport where "the likelihood that any given airline passenger of Arab ethnicity is a terrorist is so negligible that Arab ethnicity has no probative value").
149
See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)-(c) (2016); Bethany A. Gulley, Note, Criminal
LAw-No Right to Revoke and Avoid Search-Ninth Circuit Rules that Consent to
Airport Screening Cannot Be Revoked in an Administrative Search. United States v.
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007), 31 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REV. 515, 521
(2009).
150 See Gulley, supra note 149, at 521.
151 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a)(1) (2001).
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TSA Checkpoints and the Administrative Search
Exception

These searches conducted by TSA officiers at the preboarding screening checkpoints in airports are constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment based on the administrative
search exception. 15 2 The Supreme Court first established the
constitutionality of the administrative search exception in
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 1 53 where it held that administrative searches are reason-

able under the Fourth Amendment because they are conducted
as part of general regulatory schemes to further an administrative purpose rather than as part of a criminal investigation to
obtain evidence of a crime. 154 The Court in Camaraalso held
that the need to search must be balanced against the intrusion
it entails for these searches to fall under the administrative
search exception. 1 5 5 The Supreme Court later held that
searches could be classified as administrative searches "where
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 'reasonaand at
ble'-for example, searches now routine at airports
15 6
entrances to courts and other official buildings."
15 7
Then, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Davis
that the searches conducted at the TSA pre-boarding screening
checkpoints were constitutional under the administrative
search exception because:
[The] screening searches of airline passengers are conducted
as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of
weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent
hijackings. The essential purpose of the scheme is not to
detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who
carry them, but to deter persons carrying such material from
seeking to board at all. 15

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit in Davis found that pre-boarding screening searches met the balancing test for reasonableness in Camara because "[tlhe need to prevent airline hijacking
See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Id. at 538.
154
Id. at 536-37.
155
See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (citing Nat'l Treasury
156
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-76, 675 n.3 (1989).
157 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled on other grounds by United States
v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
158
Id at 908.
152

153
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was unquestionably grave and urgent" and that the search of
all passengers and their carry-on articles was "reasonably necessary to meet the need."' 5 9 However, the court also held that
the pre-boarding screening searches were only constitutionally
reasonable as long as they were "no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect the
presence of weapons or explosives." 160 The Ninth Circuit also
recognized that "routine airport screening searches will lead to
discovery of contraband and apprehension of law violators" but
that nonetheless, if "the screening of passengers and their
carry-on luggage for weapons and explosives [is] subverted into
a general search for evidence of crime," then courts would exclude the evidence obtained. 16 1
Finally, in United States v. Aukai, the Ninth Circuit held
that the reasonableness of a pre-boarding screening search
does not depend on a traveler's consent, and thus, the only
requirement for the search to be reasonable was the traveler's
election to attempt to enter the "secured area" of an airport,
which is under current TSA regulations and procedures, when
a traveler walks through the magnetometer or places items on
62
the conveyer belt of the x-ray machine. 1
B.

USBP Officers Stationed at TSA Checkpoints

USBP officers conduct immigration investigatory stops at
the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints under unique circumstances that are not relatable to those in the other three
types of immigration investigatory stops described earlier. At
airports in cities located within the 100 miles from the southern border, TSA checkpoints have USBP "details" that station
their officers within the bounds of the TSA checkpoint. 1 6 3
Since the purpose of the TSA officers is to detect the presence of
weapons, explosives, or any object that travelers might smuggle or conceal in their belongings or persons-including drugs
or currency-and local police officers are present to arrest any
159
160
161
1240,

Id. at 910.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 908-09; see also United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d
1245 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an airport pre-boarding screening search

was outside the scope of an administrative search because the search was a tool
of a criminal investigation where law enforcement officers and Flight Terminal
Security (FTS) personnel were working together, and if an FTS officer found criminal activity while searching passengers, then the FTS officer would get a reward).
162 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007).
163 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing at 15-16,
United States v. Mangal, No. 16-CR-00324 (W.D. Tex. May 18, 2016) (describing
what these airport USBP details are).
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traveler who is discovered of attempting to do so, the only inferred purpose explaining the USBP's presence at TSA checkpoints is to conduct immigration investigatory stops. 164
1.

The Typical TSA Checkpoint in an Airport Located in
the Southern Border

Typically, TSA checkpoints start at the lines formed by the
retractable belt stanchions at the entrance to the boarding gate
area, for which all travelers must pass through the TSA checkpoint without exception. 16 5 Along the retractable belt stanchions, there are warning signs about TSA safety procedures
and protocols, informing travelers about the checkpoint's purpose and procedures and informing them of the items that are
permitted or prohibited at the checkpoint. 16 6 No warning signs
informing travelers of USBP presence, purpose, procedure, or
authority are present. 167 After travelers wait in line along the
corridors formed by the retractable belt stanchions, they are
then called by TSA officers at their podiums. 16 8 Once at the
podiums, travelers must show a form of identification and their
airline tickets to the TSA officer before proceeding to the conveyor belt, where travelers place their belongings, including
69
their shoes, and then proceed through the x-ray scanner. 1
TSA requires every traveler who is eighteen years old and
older to show valid identification in order to travel. 170 TSA has
a list of valid forms of identification that may be shown to the
TSA officer at the podium in order to travel, which includes
driver's licenses from all states, passports (U.S. or foreign-is164 Id. at 16 ("The airport detail entails assisting TSA. And we check-we
oversee the people that are traveling have proper documents to travel within the
United States."); see also What Does Border PatrolDo at Airports, Other Domestic
Checkpoints?, MERCURY NEWS (July 17, 2014), https://www.mercurynews.com/

2014/07/17/what-does-border-patrol- do-at-airports- other- domestic-checkpoints/ [https://perma.cc/3TWU-MKM4] ("[USBP agents] check passports, green
cards, and other forms of identification while standing over the shoulder of a TSA
agent. Essentially, agents are on the lookout for suspicious behavior such as
extreme nervousness or appearing to be lost. If an agent sees that such a person
presents a green card but looks nervous, the agent would likely question that
person.").
165
See JBG TRAVELS, supra note 18.
166
Id.
167
See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163 at 54-55 (describing how there are no warning signs alerting to the presence,
purpose, procedure, or authority of USBP officers at the airport).
168 See JBG TRAVELS, supra note 18.
169

Id.

170
See Identification,TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/identification [https://perma.cc/GV4Y-SMNR] (last visited Aug. 25,
2019).
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sued), USCIS-issued identifications for legal aliens (permanent
resident card, employment authorization), and border crossing
cards for nonresident alien Mexican nationals, among
others. 171 Accordingly, as long as these individuals show any
of the other forms of valid identification, TSA does not require
individuals who are traveling domestically to show their passport to board their flights. 17 2 However, this policy does not
apply to non-resident aliens, who either will show their foreignissued passports or border crossing cards in the case of Mexican nationals. 1 7 3 In addition, TSA does not require legal aliens
who are traveling domestically to show their USCIS-issued
identifications or their foreign-issued passports to board their
flight, as long as legal aliens show any of the other forms of
valid identification, most commonly a state driver's license or
ID and even a U.S. Department of Defense ID for those legal
aliens serving in the Armed Forces.
When travelers present their valid forms of identification
and their airline tickets to the TSA officer at the podium, the
TSA officer first checks that the names in the airline tickets
matches the ones in the travelers' form of identification and
then that the form of identification is valid and not fraudulent,
verifying the micro prints and other features of the IDs with the
help of special lighting equipment.1 7 4 After the TSA officer in
the podium verifies the travelers' IDs, travelers proceed to the
conveyor belt where they place their belongings, including their
shoes, in trays for them to be scanned by the x-ray scanner.
After placing their belongings in the trays, travelers wait for
another TSA officer to call them to go through a magnetometer
and a CAPS-Il body scanner. 1 7 5 If any issues arise during
these procedures, TSA officers might refer travelers to further
inspections in an attempt to solve any issues. After travelers
and their belongings successfully pass through all security
procedures, including any further inspections, then the TSA
officer allows them to grab their belongings and proceed to
their boarding gate.

Id.
'71
172
See Four Tips to Remember When Checking Your ID at Airport Security,
TRANsP. SEC. ADMIN. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2018/08/02/fourtips-remember-when-checking-your-id-airport-security [https: //perma.cc/855VJZYR] (noting that TSA just requires one acceptable form of identification).
Id.
173
174
See JBG TRAVELS, supra note 18.
175
Id.
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USBP Officers and Their Activities in the TSA
Checkpoints

As mentioned above, USBP officers are stationed within the
bounds of the TSA checkpoint but they are not specifically
assigned to a specific area, since the officers are usually walking around the TSA checkpoint and approaching individuals to
question them. 1 7 6 USBP officers commonly position themselves around the area between the TSA podiums and the conveyor belts. 1 7 7 Some USBP officers stand right beside or
behind the TSA officers at the podiums to inspect the travelers
and their identification. 17 8 The purpose is to observe the forms
of identification travelers show to TSA to discern which travelers are aliens and then decide whether to question them
9
about their legal right to be in the country. 17
If USBP officers cannot immediately discern whether travelers are aliens through the IDs they showed at the TSA podium, officers will use other means to identify travelers that
might be aliens and that need to be questioned about their
right to be in the country. 18 0 The most obvious factors USBP
officers most likely will observe first from travelers are their
race and ethnicity. Officers then might likely observe the travelers' behavior as they approach them. Just like in the other
types of immigration investigatory stops, USBP officers watch
out for any behavior from the travelers that the officers interpret as "nervous," "brisk," or "furtive." 18 Furthermore, many
travelers board flights accompanied by relatives or friends, allowing USBP officers to listen carefully to the way travelers are
speaking and to perceive whether they are speaking in a lan176
See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163 at 16, 56 (describing where USBP details position themselves at the El Paso
International Airport); Transcript of Jury Trial Testimony at 12, Texas v.
Figueredo, No. 2013-CCR-5357-C (Cameron Cty. Ct. Apr. 7, 2014) (describing
where USBP officers stand at the Brownsville South Padre International Airport).
177
See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163, at 16, 56 (describing where USBP details position themselves at the El Paso
International Airport).
178
See, e.g., Omar Figueredo (@elOmarFigueredo), TWlITER (Apr. 5, 2018, 1:00
AM), https: / /twitter.com/elOmarFigueredo/status/981803872325795840/
photo/1 [http://perma.cc/C88G-ETZB] (depicting a USBP officer standing right
next to a TSA officer at a podium).
179 See Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supranote 163, at
16-17.
180 See Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supranote 163, at
58-61.
181 IcL (describing what USBP officers look for to justify an Immigration investigatory stop at the airport).
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guage other than English, English with a "foreign accent" or
with a poor ability to speak English. 182
USBP officers also regularly interact with the travelers as
they go through the TSA checkpoint. Sometimes USBP officers
might directly approach travelers and start asking them about
their travel plans or immigration status.'8 33 However, most of
the time, USBP officers interact with travelers as they go
through the TSA checkpoint under the guise of aiding travelers
in following the TSA procedures or in speeding up the screening
process.18 4 The real purpose behind these interactions is for
travelers to expose themselves by revealing information that
USBP officers might interpret and use in their decision to detain and question them for their immigration status or right to
be in the country. For example, USBP officers would walk between the TSA podiums and the conveyor belt, approach travelers that look disoriented or those not following TSA
procedures appropriately, and tell these travelers what to
do. 18 5 Finally, USBP officers are also just walking around

these two checkpoint areas and making themselves available
for any questions the travelers might have, which might be
more convenient for the officers when they later detain a traveler and explain in their reports that it was the traveler who
initiated a "consensual" interaction with them. 186
C.

Omar and Nancy

The story of Omar Figueredo and Nancy Morales illustrates
how USBP officers conduct these immigration investigatory
stops at the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints. In addi182

See, e.g., Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Stopping Americans for Speaking

Spanish. The Latest Evidence That Border Patrol Agents Have Too Much Power,
Vox (May 21, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/21/17376436/border-pat
rol-agents- stop -american-women-speaking-spanish-montana [http://perma.cc/
J739-9ZKW] (reporting that two American women were stopped in a small town in
Montana after they were speaking Spanish); Deyvid Morales, Greyhound and
Border Patrol,YouTUBE (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOD
jPpTrZiY [http://perma.cc/ZHU6-WDNV (depicting a passenger who asks a
USBP officer conducting an immigration investigatory stop inside an Amtrak train
what would raise their suspicion of undocumented immigrants, and the USBP
officer answers "Accent.").
183 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163, at 17 (describing the types of "basic questions" they ask travelers as they go
through the TSA checkpoint).
Id. at 19.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 63. Although these USBP techniques do not appear to be unreasona186
ble at first, this Note wifl argue why these techniques are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See infra Part IV.

20191

"TRAVELING WHILE HISPANIC"

1431

tion, their story shows an example of the legal consequences of
refusing to answer a USBP officer's immigration questions, and
how the USBP "free-rides" on the conditions of the TSA checkpoint and the airport environment to coerce travelers into answering their questions about immigration status.
In March 2013, two Hispanic Cornell University students,
Omar Figueredo and Nancy Morales, traveled to Brownsville,
Texas to visit family. 18 7 After the couple stayed with Omar's
family for a couple of days, Omar and Nancy were ready to fly
back to Ithaca, New York to resume their studies. 188 Their
flight was departing from the Brownsville South Padre Island
International Airport, just a couple of miles away from the
southern border across the Mexican city of Matamoros. 18 9
Omar and Nancy arrived at the airport early in the morning,
checked in their luggage, and then proceeded to the pre-boarding TSA screening checkpoint. 190
The pre-boarding security checkpoint at Brownsville South
Padre Island International Airport follows the same security
procedures as any other airport in the United States. 19 1 However, the TSA checkpoint at the Brownsville South Padre Island
International Airport had USBP officers stationed within its
bounds. 19 2 The USBP officers in this case were walking around
the retractable belt stanchions and would position themselves
right between the end of the waiting line and the TSA
93
podiums. 1

Omar and Nancy were making the way along the retractable belt stanchions towards the TSA checkpoint, until they
were stopped by a USBP officer before they could reach the
podium.19 4 The USBP officer then asked Omar and Nancy
whether they were U.S. citizens, but Omar politely refused to
answer the question. Omar has had enough previous encounters with the USBP throughout his lifetime to know that
95
the USBP kept harassing him because of the way he looks. 1
187
188

See Transcript of Jury Trial Testimony, supra note 176, at 54.
Id.

189

Id.

190

I& at 54-56.
Id. at 57.
192 Id. at 6 ("[Tihe two border patrol agents that are on duty, they're assigned to
check citizenship or ask for U.S.-they ask 'U.S. Citizen?'"), 58 ("There were two
border patrol agents standing several paces ahead of the TSA agents that we were
going to-that we were planning to show our IDs and boarding passes to.").
193 Id. at 11-12. In fact, after waiting in line, travelers must first pass through
the USBP area before getting to the TSA podiums. Id. at 26.
191

194

Id.

195

Id. at 68-69.

at 58.
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Omar, a proud American, 19 6 was tired of living in fear and
believed he was standing up for his rights under the Constitution by refusing to answer the question. 19 7 During previous
encounters with the USBP in different circumstances, like roving patrols, Omar had politely refused to answer the same
question and he was let go without any consequences. 198
Yet, the USBP officer surprised Omar by telling him and
Nancy that he was not going to let them through because they
refused to answer his question. 199 Confused, Omar asked the
officer why they could not go through if they were not under
arrest, and the officer then told him that he, Omar, was being
detained. 2 ° ° After Omar and Nancy had a lengthy discussion
with the USBP officer that made the travelers in the line behind
them angry, the officer eventually let Omar and Nancy return to
airport's main entrance to allow other travelers through. 2 0 1 Regardless, the damage was already done because Omar and
20 2
Nancy had already missed their flight.
After they were let go and later rebooked their flight, Omar
and Nancy waited in line along the retractable belt stanchions
once again to proceed to the TSA checkpoint. 20 3 However, they
were both stopped again by another USBP officer, who also
asked them about their immigration status. 20 4 Omar again
politely refused to answer the question. 20 5 The officer detained
them again and told them they would not be able to go through
until they answered the question. 20 6 Another lengthy discussion ensued, but by now, local police had been alerted by the
USBP officers about the situation. 20 7 In the end, the local police officers arrested Omar for obstructing a public passageway
196
Id at 96.
197
Id. at 64, 68-69, 77-80. Even while in northern New York, Omar has been
stopped by the USBP officers to inquire about his citizenship. Id. at 64.
198
I& at 67-68.
199
Id. at 59, 61, 62.
I& at 62.
200
201
Id. at 61.
202
Id.
Id. at 69-70. Omar's testimony also corroborates that the only way to get to
203
the TSA podiums was to go through the area where the USBP officers were stationed. Id. at 89.
204

Id.

at 70.

205 Id. at 71.
206 Id. at 21, 71-72, 85, 91-92. In fact, the USBP officer told Omar numerous
times that he was being detained and that he was not free to leave because "he
was not following the protocol at the airport for the border patrol agent." Id at 21.
207 The police officer had advised Omar that his conduct could be considered
disorderly conduct or breach of the peace and could be arrested. Id. at 28.
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and Nancy for interference with public duties. 20 8 Nancy was
able to record the moment officers arrested Omar, and Nancy,
frustrated and defenseless, kept asking: "What is the crime?l
20 9
What is the crime?"
IV
USBP IMMIGRATION INVESTIGATORY STOPS AT THE TSA
CHECKPOINTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A.

USBP Immigration Investigatory Stops at TSA
Checkpoints Closely Match and Resemble Stops
Made During Roving Patrols

The manner in which USBP officers conduct immigration
investigatory stops at the TSA checkpoints does not match or
resemble the conditions of stops made at the international
ports of entry, functional equivalents of the border, or domestic
fixed checkpoints. Therefore, this Note argues that these stops
most closely match or resemble the conditions of a roving patrol. Consequently, USBP officers are required to have sufficient reasonable suspicion that an individual is illegally
present in the country before conducting an immigration investigatory stop. Considering the objective inference that travelers
within the TSA checkpoint who are questioned about their immigration status are not free to leave until they relent and
answer the officers' questions, and the limited articulable facts
USBP officers can observe and obtain under these circumstances to raise their suspicion of undocumented immigrants,
these immigration investigatory stops are unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
1.

The USBP ImmigrationInvestigatory Stop at the TSA
Checkpoint Does Not Match or Resemble the
Characteristicsof a Stop at an International
Port of Entry or a FunctionalEquivalent
of the Border

Immigration investigatory stops conducted by USBP officers at TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints do not fit
208 Id. at 32. The police officer that arrested Omar testified that he knew the
USBP officer who had stopped Omar the second time was planning on taking him

into custody as soon as the flight he was supposed to board finished boarding. Id.
at 22.
209
See Democracy Nowl, EXCLUSIVE: U.S. Citizens Arrested at Airport for
Refusing Border PatrolQuestions,YoUTUBE (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=_koO3eXwaCA.
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under the border search exception of the Fourth Amendment
because airports, as a whole, are not international ports of
entry or functional equivalents of the border. Since all airports
are inside the boundaries of the Unites States and travelers
using U.S. airports as their airport of origin are not entering the
country from the outside, the TSA checkpoints cannot be international ports of entry. 2 10 Even those airports located within
100 air miles from the border are still not considered international ports of entry because 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) explicitly
limits the power of immigration employees to "board and
search for aliens" inside dwellings without a warrant or proba2 11
ble cause.
Furthermore, no TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoint is
likely to be classified as a functional equivalent of the border
because interior airports do not meet the standards of the Fifth
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit. While the Supreme Court held in
Almeida-Sanchez that searches of "the passengers and cargo of
[the] airplane[s]" from incoming flights that arrived after a nonstop flight from a foreign country to an interior airport are the
"functional equivalent of a border search," the Court did not
hold that the search of any people and cargo of airplanes inside
any of the interior airports' installations were the functional
equivalents of a border search. 2 12 Indeed, even the three interior airports that are closest to the U.S.-Mexico border in Texas
that have USBP details stationed in their TSA checkpointslocated in Brownsville, McAllen, and El Paso-fail to meet the
Fifth Circuit's stricter reasonable certainty standard. 2 13 For
210 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-20 (1977) (holding that
stops on individuals at the border or at international ports of entry are reasonable
because the individuals entered the country from the outside and because of the
recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations
imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country).
211
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1994) ("Any officer or employee of the Service
authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power
without warrant... within a [one hundred air miles] from any external boundary
of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance or
vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles from any such external boundary to have access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling
").
the border to prevent illegal entry of aliens into the United States ...
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) ("[A] search of
212
the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a
nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a
border search.").
See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 860 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe
213
government must demonstrate with 'reasonable certainty' that the traffic passing
through the checkpoint is 'international' in character."). Since the Fifth Circuit's
standard is stricter and narrower than the Ninth Circuit's, these three interior
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instance, Figure 1 shows passenger traffic statistics for the last
seven years from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics-a
subdivision from the United States Department of Transportation-for the Brownsville South Padre International Airport,
where Omar Figueredo and Nancy Morales were stopped.
FIGURE
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Domestic
80,801
88,872
94,828
106,525
100,811
102,629
107,128

1214

International
4,117
813
0
123
27
0
0

Total
84,918
89,685
94,828
106,648
100,838
102,629
107,128

In Jackson, the Fifth Circuit overruled its own precedent
after using the reasonable certainty standard and finding that
the classification of the Sierra Blanca checkpoint located in
Texas as a functional equivalent of the border was errone-

ous. 2 15 The Fifth Circuit explained that the purpose of the

reasonable certainty standard was to limit the classification of
functional equivalent of the border for those checkpoints that
"intercept no more than a negligible number of domestic travelers." 2 16 Considering the Fifth Circuit's purpose behind the

standard, even when international passenger traffic was the
highest in 2012 at the Brownsville South Padre Island International Airport with 4,117 passengers, domestic passenger traffic still accounted for 95.15% of overall passenger traffic at the
airports also fail to meet the Ninth Circuit's standard. See United States v.
Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974), affd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916
(1975) ("[Alt a location where virtually everyone searchedhas just come from the
other side of the border, [then] the [interior checkpoint] is a functional equivalent
of a border search." (emphasis added)).
214 PassengersAll Carriers-Brownsville,7X: Brownsville South Padre Island
International (Origin Airport), U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS.,
https: //www.transtats.bts.gov/Data Elements.aspx?Data= 1 [https: //perma.cc/
PW5L-VVKQ] (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
215 See Jackson, 825 F.2d at 854. ("The en banc court now decides that the
Sierra Blanca checkpoint should not have been regarded as a border equivalent.
We further hold that the plenary searches presently conducted at the Sierra
Blanca checkpoint are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.").
Id. at 860.
216
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airport. 2 17 As such, the Brownsville South Padre Island International Airport fails to meet the reasonable certainty standard
of the Fifth Circuit-as well as the less strict standard of the
Ninth Circuit-for the classification of functional equivalent of
the border. Therefore, the border search exception does not
apply to the USBP immigration investigatory stops at the preboarding TSA screening checkpoint at the Brownsville South
Padre Island Airport.
Figures 2 and 3 show passenger traffic statistics for the
last seven years for the McAllen Miller International Airport
and the El Paso International Airport, respectively.
FIGURE
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Domestic
325,656
334,359
374,211
385,377
347,362
326,602
338,871
FIGURE

Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Domestic
1,399,252
1,330,998
1,358,028
1,350,744
1,380,933
1,421,551
1,587,192

2218

International
128
5,448
7,488
4,909
6,217
7,627
5,173

Total
325,784
339,807
381,699
390,286
353,579
334,229
339,044

3219

Intemational
11
41
16
1
23
22
0

Total
1,399,263
1,331,039
1,358,044
1,350,745
1,380,956
1,421,573
1,587,192

See supra Figure 1.
Passengers All Carriers-Mission/McAllen/Edinburg,TX: McAllen Miller
International (Origin Airport), U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS.,
https: //www.transtats.bts.gov/Data Elements.aspx?Data= 1 [https://perma.cc/
58HR-VRAC] (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
219
PassengersAll Carriers-ElPaso, TX: El Paso International(OriginAirport),
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANS. STATS., https://www.transtats.bts.gov/
DataElements.aspx?Data= 1 [https://perma.cc/ZP7W-RPY9] (last visited Sept.
4, 2018).
217
218
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Like the statistics from Brownsville South Padre Island Airport, the statistics for these two airports show that their TSA
pre-boarding screening checkpoints would also fail to meet the
Fifth Circuit's standard, even during those years when international passenger traffic was the highest. As such, assuming
that USBP evaluated the conditions in these airports located
closest to the border to decide whether to assign details to
them, it is highly likely that all other interior airports will fail to
meet the standards of the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit for
the classification of functional equivalent of the border. Therefore, the border search exception is most likely inapplicable to
the USBP immigration investigatory stops at the TSA preboarding screening checkpoints.
2.

The USBP Immigration Investigatory Stop at the TSA
Checkpoint Does Not Match or Resemble the
Characteristicsof a Stop at a Domestic
Fixed Checkpoint

Immigration investigatory stops conducted by USBP officers at TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints do not fit the
characteristics of a stop at a domestic fixed checkpoint because
neither, the TSA checkpoints nor the USBP details stationed in
them are permanent or temporary checkpoints as described in
Martinez-Fuerte. First, the congressional mandate authorizing
TSA checkpoints at the airport does not extend the authorization to enforce immigration law,2 20 but rather only to detect

and thwart potential attacks and prospective terrorist attacks
by detecting concealed weapons, explosives, or other destructive substances. 2 2 1 Furthermore, searches at TSA checkpoints
by TSA officers are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
under the administrative search exception because they are
conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme to further an
administrative purpose-"to prevent the carrying of weapons or
explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings" 2 2 2 -rather than as part of a criminal investigation to obtain evidence of a crime. 2 2 3 Therefore, any immigration
investigatory stops conducted within the bounds of TSA checkpoints with the purpose to obtain evidence of a crime-namely
220 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)-(c) (2016).
See Guey, supra note 149, at 521; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a)(1) (2001)
221
(requiring airports to refuse to transport passengers who do not consent to a

search).
222 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), overruLed on
other grounds by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
223 See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
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illegal immigration 224 -would be outside the scope of an administrative search because the search would be a tool of a
criminal investigation.

2 25

Second, the presence of the USBP details within the
bounds of the TSA checkpoint and their activities do not match
the description of the domestic fixed checkpoints in MartinezFuerte. Although it may be argued that the presence of the
USBP details in TSA checkpoints serves the same purposes of a
domestic fixed checkpoint 2 2 6 and that prior authorization of a
warrant is not required, 2 2 7 TSA checkpoints lack the core features that characterize immigration investigatory stops conducted in domestic fixed checkpoints as less intrusive and
frightening in contrast to those conducted during roving patrols. 2 2 8 The Court in Martinez-Fuerteexplained that stops at

domestic fixed checkpoints are less intrusive because travelers
can see that others are being stopped and that there are visible
signs of the USBP officers' authority. 2 2 9 Furthermore, these
visible signs reassure legitimate travelers that these stops have
a minimum of potential interference with legitimate traffic and
that operations in the checkpoint are conducted in a regularized manner that does not resemble discretionary enforcement
activity, and therefore, legitimate travelers are reassured that
these stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public
interest. 230
Although TSA checkpoints do have warning signs at airports warning travelers about the TSA's authority and all travelers see that every single traveler is searched, there are no
warnings signs at airports informing travelers about the presence or authority of USBP officers, and travelers see that only a
few travelers-mostly members of minority groups 2 3 1-are
224
See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1996).
225
See Davis, 482 F.2d at 908. Logically, this conclusion means that TSA
officers may not purposely aid USBP officers in any way to conduct their immigration investigatory stops. See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d
1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an airport pre-boarding screening search
was outside the scope of an administrative search because the search was a tool
of a criminal investigation where law enforcement officers and Flight Terminal
Security (FTS) personnel were working together, and if an FTS officer found criminal activity while searching passengers, then the FTS officer would get a reward).
226
See United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 405 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
227
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
228
Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
(1975)).
229
Id.
230
Id. at 559.
231
See UNCOVERING USBP, supra note 15, at 17 ("The 1-44 data shows that
USBP's arrest practices affect lawfully present noncitizens from all over the globe.
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2
stopped and questioned by USBP officers. 23 Therefore, the
presence of USBP details at TSA checkpoints "bears arbitrarily
or oppressively" 23 3 on members of minority groups as a class
because USBP details interfere with a large portion of legitimate traffic 2 34-exclusively from members of minority
groups-and their operations are not conducted in a regularized manner that appear to involve less discretionary enforcement activity. 2 35 Ultimately, legitimate travelers who are
members of minority groups are not reassured that these im"duly authorized and believed
migration investigatory stops23are
6
to serve the public interest."
Consequently, neither TSA checkpoints nor the presence of
USBP details within their bounds fit the description of domestic fixed checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, and therefore, the
holding in Martinez-Fuertethat dispenses with the reasonable
suspicion standard for immigration investigatory stops does
not apply in these stops at the TSA checkpoints.

3.

The USBP Immigration Investigatory Stop at the TSA
Checkpoint Matches and Resembles the
Characteristicsof a Stop Made During
a Roving Patrol

Since USBP immigration investigatory stops at TSA preboarding screening checkpoints do not fall under the other two
categories of immigration investigatory stops, these stops must
fall under the category of roving patrols described by the Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce. This conclusion is supported
by the manner in which USBP officers conduct these stops
because officers do not approach every single traveler at TSA
checkpoints 2 3 7 and actually only target specific travelersThe greatest impact, however, appears to be on noncitizens of color. The vast
majority of those wrongfully arrested were from South Asian, East Asian, African,
and Caribbean backgrounds." (footnotes omitted)).
See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
232
163, at 54-55 (describing that there are no warning signs alerting to the presence,
purpose, procedure, or authority of USBP officers at the airport).
233 Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559.
234 According the Bureau of Transportation statistics of the Department of
Transportation for Brownsville South Padre International Airport, McAllen Miller
International Airport, and El Paso International Airport, nearly 95-99% of passenger traffic was domestic for the last seven years. See supra Figures 1-3. Therefore, USBP officers overwhelmingly interfere with legitimate traffic.
235 See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559.
236 IJ
237 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163 at 16 ("Q. Do you talk to everyone who comes through TSA? A. Not
everyone.").
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most, if not all, members of minority groups 238 -in part because of the approval of the use of "Hispanic appearance" as a
2 39
valid factor in the analysis.
Whenever USBP officers approach travelers within the
bounds of the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoint to ask
them questions about their citizenship, these interactions are
in fact stops and not consensual interactions because travelers
are seized under the Fourth Amendment for two reasons: (1)
the compulsory conditions of the checkpoint; and (2) USBP
officers ask questions that elicit a potentially self-incriminating
response from travelers.
First, the compulsory conditions at the TSA pre-boarding
screening checkpoint render travelers objectively "seized"
under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the compulsory conditions at the TSA checkpoint present a completely different set
of circumstances from those found "on the street or in another
public place" where law enforcement officers may approach
individuals and ask them questions without triggering the
Fourth Amendment. 2 40 Unlike individuals walking on the
street or in another public place, travelers going through a TSA
checkpoint have their liberty restrained after they yield to the
TSA's "show of authority" to search them for weapons and explosives. 24 1 In effect, travelers are not "free to leave" because
the holding in United States v. Aukai and current TSA regulations render TSA's questioning and searches reasonable per
the administrative search exception once travelers have entered the "secured area" of the airport, after which travelers
cannot elect not to undergo the TSA search. 242 In other words,
the travelers' consent to the questioning and searches at the
TSA checkpoints is irrelevant. Therefore, unlike the bus passengers in Floridav. Bostick24 3 and the workers in INS v. DelSee UNCOVERING USBP, supra note 15, at 17.
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975). This
Note argues that the manner in which USBP applies the vague "Hispanic appearance" factor also puts members of minority groups at risk of being stopped for
their immigration status. See infra Part V.B.
240
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) ("[L]aw enforcement officers
do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some
questions .. ").
241
See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
242
See supranote 162 and accompanying text.
243
501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991) (finding that the "free to leave" analysis for
seizures was not applicable in defendant's situation because his freedom of movement was limited by a factor independent of police conduct-being a bus passenger-even though the police officers blocked the entrance to the bus).
238

239
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gado,2 44 the travelers' freedom of movement is restricted by
state action-the TSA officers and the checkpoint itself-and
not by a factor independent of state action-namely, by being
245
travelers wishing to board an airplane.

Second, when USBP officers ask travelers about their citizenship status, these questions are intrusive because officers
are throwing the travelers' citizenship into question and are
eliciting potentially self-incriminating responses from travelers. 2 4 6 It is true that in Martinez-Fuerte,the Supreme Court

found that asking vehicle occupants in a domestic checkpoint
"a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States" was not
intrusive. 2 4 7 However, the Court made clear that this type of

questioning was not intrusive because "motorist[s] can see that
other vehicles are being stopped, [they] can see visible signs of
the officers' authority, and [they are] much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." 2 4 8

As mentioned

above, none of these warning signs stating the USBP's authority are present at the TSA checkpoint, and most importantly,
not all of the travelers are stopped. 2 4 9

Moreover, since the

Court never established what kind of documents would evidence a right to be in the United States, even U.S. citizensparticularly those with Hispanic ancestry-might be unable to
prove they are rightfully in the country only with their state

244
466 U.S. 210, 219-20 (1984) (finding that workers inside a factory were not
seized when INS agents visited the factory at random and stationed agents at the
exits, while others questioned the workers).
245
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
Undocumented immigrants are not the only ones at risk of giving self246
incriminating responses. See, e.g., Sieff, supranote 50 (reporting about a growing
number of U.S. citizens along the southern border-mostly, if not all, of Hispanic
ancestry-that hold U.S. birth certificates but are being denied passports, jailed
in Immigration detention centers, and entered into deportation proceedings after
being accused of using a fraudulent birth certificate). As Omar's story illustrates,
throwing one's citizenship into question can provoke anxiety and proved to be
more intrusive than believed, especially if it is not the first time this has happened. See infra, Part III.C; cf. Illinois v. Lldster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004)
("[Illnformation-seeking highway stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove
intrusive. The stops are likely brief. The police are not likely to ask questions
designed to elicit self-incriminating information.").
247
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976).
248
Id. at 558.
See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
249
163, at 54-55, 58-61 (describing that there are no warning signs alerting to the
presence, purpose, procedure, or authority of USBP officers at the airport, and
what USBP officers look for to justify an immigration investigatory stop at the
airport).
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ID. 2 50 And most importantly, in Brignoni-Ponce, the Court re-

quired USBP officers to have reasonable suspicion that an individual is a suspected illegal alien before they conduct an
immigration investigatory stop, but they declined to resolve
whether USBP officers "also may stop persons reasonably believed to be aliens when there is no reason to believe they are
illegally in the country."2 5 1 So, it does not follow that-for those
stops made during roving patrols-USBP officers do not need
reasonable suspicion to stop individuals they suspect only to
be aliens if the officers have no reason to believe they are illegaily in the country.
Hence, whenever USBP officers approach travelers and ask
them questions at the TSA checkpoint, these interactions are
not consensual and constitute a stop. USBP officers essentially "free-ride" on the checkpoint's compulsory conditions because travelers have already been forewarned of the TSA's
authority, and travelers understand and expect to be questioned and searched by TSA before boarding their flights. Since
travelers are objectively "seized" under the Fourth Amendment
and understand that they must follow TSA security procedures
to board their flights, they understandably expect to be questioned and searched by any of the authorities within the
bounds of the checkpoint. Certainly, the common traveler will
not understand which government officers can conduct what
kinds of stops and searches or their permissible scope. Not
surprisingly, travelers will equate following required TSA security procedures with following instructions and answering
questions from any of the authorities present at the checkpoint, especially those coming from uniformed USBP officers
with holstered weapons who address travelers in an authoritative tone. 2 5 2

USBP officers are in fact using the compulsory

250
Even the citizenship of those citizens who were born in the United States,
who hold a U.S. birth certificate, and who have served in the military might be
thrown into question. See, e.g., Sieff, supranote 50 (reporting that a current state
prison guard who was a former service member and also, ironically, a USBP
agent, was denied a U.S. passport and accused of using a fraudulent birth
certificate).
251
See United States. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 n.9 (1975) (emphasis added).
252 According to the Supreme Court, even though the workers in Delgadowere
not "free to leave" without being questioned first, the officers' conduct gave the
employees "no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful
answers to the questions put to them or ifthey simply refused to answer." See
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (emphasis added). Unlike the workers in
Delgado, travelers wishing to board their flights do not know whether they would
be detained for refusing to answer the USBP officers' questions about their citizenship because there are no warning signs about the scope of their authority and
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conditions of the checkpoint to elicit answers to their intrusive
questions and travelers will reasonably feel compelled to answer any questions from them, even those that might seem
potentially troubling, under the guise of consensual

interactions. 253
As such, these interactions between USBP officers and
travelers at the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoint must
fall under the category of stops, and not consensual interactions. Therefore, USBP officers must have objective articulable
facts amounting to reasonable suspicion to conduct these immigration investigatory stops at TSA checkpoints. However,
the particular circumstances surrounding the TSA checkpoint,
combined with the manner in which USBP officers to conduct
these stops, make these stops unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
B.

USBP Officers Conducting Immigration Investigatory
Stops at the TSA Checkpoint Cannot Possibly
Satisfy the Reasonable Suspicion Standard

USBP officers solely rely on their observations within the
TSA checkpoint to obtain sufficient valid articulable facts that
amount to reasonable suspicion to detain travelers they suspect to be undocumented aliens. This Note argues that, with
the exception of those situations in which USBP officers are
able to discern whether travelers are aliens based on the forms
of identification they show to the TSA officer, 2 5 4 officers cannot
because travelers understand that they must go through the checkpoint and
follow all of the TSA security procedures before being able to board their flights. In
fact, Omar's story illustrates how USBP officers detain travelers who refuse to
answer their questions about citizenship. See Transcript of Jury Trial Testimony,
supra note 176, at 59, 61, 62.
253
The USBP officers' conduct goes beyond what the Fourth Amendment allows. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991) ("We have stated that
even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may
generally ask questions of that individual ....
ask to examine the individual's
identification.... and request consent to search his or her luggage. . . -as long
as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is
required." (emphasis added)).
254
However, in these situations, USBP officers are able to discern the forms of
identification that travelers show at the podiums because the TSA officers allow
them to do so. In other words, TSA officers are complicit in helping USBP officers
investigate criminal activity-namely, illegal immigration-and therefore, their
screening procedures go beyond the scope of the administrative search and such
information must be excluded. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523,
538 (1967); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007);
see also United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.
1989).
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possibly satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard solely on
their observations. According to the Supreme Court's decision
in Brignoni-Ponce, the following set of factors would be valid
factors that USBP officers will consider in their decision to stop
pedestrian travelers 2 5 5 at the TSA checkpoint to question them
about their immigration status: (1) characteristics of the area
where they encounter the traveler (proximity to the border,
patterns of traffic, and previous experience with alien traffic);
(2) information about recent illegal crossings in the area; (3) the
traveler's behavior (erratic behavior or attempts to evade officers); and (4) the traveler's "Hispanic appearance." 2 5 6 In general, since the "area" where these roving patrols are conducted
is strictly within the bounds of the TSA checkpoints, only traveler traffic that is boarding flights from the airport need be
considered.
For illustration purposes, consider the circumstances of
Brownsville South Padre International Airport, where Omar
Figueredo and Nancy Morales were detained. First, the proximity of Brownsville South Padre International Airport to the
border with Mexico is about 5.5 miles, 2 5 7 and the patterns of
traveler traffic inside the airport are virtually all domestic, and
thus previous experience with alien traffic is negligible. 2 5 8 Second, the airport's information about recent illegal crossings
would also be negligible considering that virtually all traveler
traffic is domestic. 2 5 9 Third, although behavior depends on
each particular traveler, the compulsory conditions of the TSA
checkpoint must be taken into account, as well as their effect
on the travelers' behavior. People are not regularly under the
compulsory conditions of a TSA checkpoint, and thus their
behaviors might not be as they would under a setting free of
those compulsory conditions. Accordingly, the same issues
that arise in "drug courier profile" cases are present in these
situations because the behaviors of travelers under the compulsory conditions of a TSA checkpoint might be easily classi-

255 See Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976)
(holding that "Mexican appearance" alone did not provide the basis for reasonable
suspicion in pedestrian stops).
256 See Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 884-87; Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701
(9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d 1160, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979).
257 About BRO, BROWNSVILLE S. PADRE ISLAND INT'L AIRPORT, http://flybrownsville.com/about-bro/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/CLE9-MT9Y] (last visited
Sept. 5, 2018).
See supra Figure 1.
258
259
Id.
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fled as "nervous," "brisk," or "furtive."260 Therefore, suspicious
behaviors will be difficult to distinguish from "reasonable innocent behaviors" that can be expected from travelers at the
26 1
checkpoint.
Finally, USBP officers at the Brownsville South Padre International Airport would consider the travelers' "Hispanic appearance" as a factor in their decision to detain them as
suspected aliens. 2 6 2 Since airports do not collect information
about the races and ethnicities of travelers, and the domestic
passenger traffic in the Brownsville South Padre Island Airport

in particular is over

95%,263

the population statistics for the

city of Brownsville are the best proxy variable available. According to U.S. Census Bureau, in 2015, the total population of
Brownsville was 177,795 and from that figure, over 166,000
people or 93.1% of the total population identified as Hispanic
or Latino. 2 6 4 Since over 90% of the population of Brownsville
identifies as Hispanic or Latino and over 95% of travel at
Brownsville South Padre International Airport is domestic, the
factor of "Hispanic appearance" in this area loses its probative
value in the reasonable suspicion analysis in its entirety. 2 6 5
Consequently, "Hispanic appearance" is of such little probative
value that, although it might be relevant, it is not a reliable
factor to justify an immigration investigatory stop at the TSA
checkpoint.266
Since USBP officers conduct immigration investigatory
stops when they are unable to observe sufficient articulable
facts that amount to reasonable suspicion that travelers are
undocumented immigrants, officers are either arbitrarily conducting these stops or relying entirely on the travelers' race and
260 See United States v. Mfllan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Garvin, 576 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 n.1 (N.D. Il. 1983); United States v.
Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
261
See Flame, supra note 72, at 338; see also United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d

710, 712 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding where a reasonable suspicion factor and its
opposite can both be used by law enforcement officers to justify stopping an
individual, in that case glancing repeatedly and avoiding eye contact with a USBP
officer, then both factors lose their probative value).
262 See Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 884-87; United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d
1160, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979); Nicaclo v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
263 See supra Figure 1.
264 Brownsville, Texas (City), STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/place/
Texas/Brownsville/Race-and-Ethnicity [https://perma.cc/SM7Q-8MTT] (last
visited Dec. 1, 2017).
265 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that "Hispanic appearance," just like any other factor in the
reasonable suspicion standard, loses its probative value when it is likely to sweep
many ordinary citizens into a generality of suspicious appearance).
266 Id.
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ethnicity, and therefore, conducting unreasonable stops under
the Fourth Amendment. Oddly enough, this conclusion was
reached by assuming that USBP officers were using the "Hispanic appearance" factor in the way the Supreme Court intended the classification to be used. But in this next section,
this Note will expose that even the Court's foundations for the
"Hispanic appearance" factor are more astounding-and absurd-than initially thought.
V
THE "HISPANIC APPEARANCE" FACTOR IN THE REASONABLE
SUSPICION STANDARD VIOLATES THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE

The "Hispanic appearance" factor in the reasonable suspicion standard set by the Supreme Court in 1975 is an outdated, extremely flawed, and stereotypical ethnic classification
that violates the Equal Protection Clause. As explained above,
law enforcement officers conduct investigatory stops by relying
on their observations of an individual's characteristics and
conduct and of the environment where they observe the individual, all of which are later considered in the totality of the
circumstances test.2 6 7 In the case of the reasonable suspicion

standard in the context of immigration law enforcement, all
else equal, an immigration law enforcement officer is more
likely to stop an individual with a "Hispanic appearance" than
someone who does not have one. 2 6 8 Therefore, since this eth-

nic classification exists on the face of the law-a USBP practice
approved by the Supreme Court's opinion in Brignoni-Ponceand it "curtail[s] the civil rights of a single [ethnic classification] ,"269 the "Hispanic appearance" classification is "inimedi2 70
ately suspect."
All racial or ethnic classifications imposed by the govern271
To pass strict
ment must be analyzed under strict scrutiny.

See Johnson, supranote 67, at 218.
Ironically, Justice Powell, the author of the Brignoni-Ponceopinion, would
have agreed that an ethnic classification such as the "Hispanic appearance" factor
would be found unconstitutional. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (1978) ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.").
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Carbado &
269
Harris, supranote 42, at 1576.
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
270
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
271
267
268
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scrutiny, the government must prove that the ethnic classification is a narrowly tailored measure to further compelling government interests. 2 72 Although policing the border for illegal
immigration to further national security might be a compelling
governing interest, 2 7 3 the use of an individual's "Hispanic appearance" is not a narrowly tailored measure that furthers national security because the classification is overinclusive,
underinclusive, and the government has never argued that border security can be achieved through any less discriminatory
alternative. 2 7 4 The "Hispanic appearance" classification is
overinclusive, underinclusive, and extremely troubling for a
number of reasons, but most prominently because: (1) it was
established by the use of misleading population statistics; and
(2) its legal definition is ludicrous and defies logic.
A.

Misleading Population Statistics

As explained above in Part II, when the Court first announced this ethnic classification in Brignoni-Ponce, its first
formulation was "apparent Mexican ancestry." 2 7 5 The Court

added this ethnic classification to the reasonable suspicion
standard for searches and seizures of undocumented immigrants because the Court concluded that "[tihe likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough
to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor."2 7 6 The only

support the Court had for this broad claim were the population
statistics cited in a footnote within the opinion:
The 1970 census and the INS figures for alien registration in
1970 provide the following information about the MexicanAmerican population in the border States. There were
1,619,064 persons of Mexican origin in Texas, and 200,004
(or 12.4%) of them registered as aliens from Mexico. In New
Mexico there were 119,049 persons of Mexican origin, and
10,171 (or 8.5%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there were
239,811 persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or 14.2%)
Id. at 227.
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (holding that the exigencies of war and the
threat to national security were a compelling government interest that justified
the evacuation and Internment of Japanese Americans during World War II). But
see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) ("The forcible relocation of U.S.
citizens to concentrations camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is
objectively unlawful ... Korematsuwas gravely wrong the day it was decided, has
been overruled in the court of history, and-to be clear-'has no place in law
under the Constitution.'").
274
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
275
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975).
276
Id. at 887.
272
273
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registered as aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 persons of Mexican origin, and 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as
aliens ....These figures, of course, do not present the entire
picture. The number of registered aliens from Mexico has
increased since 1970 .... and we assume that very few illegal
immigrants appear in the registration figures. On the other
hand, many of the 950,000 other persons of Spanish origin
living in these border States... may have a physical appear77
2
ance similar to persons of Mexican origin.

Based on this footnote, it can be assumed that the Court reasoned that these population statistics of people with Mexican
origin for the states along the southern border were a good
proxy for estimating the probability of immigration law enforcement encountering undocumented immigrants. However, the
Court's use of the term "aliens" and the relevant statistics is
misleading because it erroneously assumes that the percentages of registered "aliens" in the southern-border states are
reliable indicators of the presence of undocumented immigrants in the region without having any available statistics on
undocumented immigrants in these states. Hence, the Court
improperly insinuated that since a fraction of registered
"aliens" in the southern-border was of Mexican origin, then an
individual's Mexican origin was correlated to that individual's
probability of being an alien illegally in the country-completely disregarding the deeply-rooted Mexican American population in these states. 2 7 8 This conclusion lacks not only a
factual, but also a logical basis. This faulty logic led to the
Court's atrocious reasoning for the "apparent Mexican ancestry" classification and to sanction the USBP's practice of equating "aliens illegally in the country" with people of Mexican

origin.
To make matters worse, the Supreme Court clearly misunderstood-or blatantly ignored-how the Attorney General's
100-mile border definition applies not only to the southernborder states, but to the perimeter of the entire country, including the perimeters of Alaska and Hawaii. 2 79 If the Court had

really contemplated how the 100-mile border defimition applied
throughout the country, it would have realized that the "apparent Mexican heritage" classification was sanctioning the in277

Id. at 886-87 n.12.
See Carbado & Harris, supra note 42, at 1594 ("To begin, the presence of
Mexicans in the United States was largely a consequence of the movement of a
border rather than the movement of people. The delineation of the border was the
result of the U.S.-Mexican war.").
279
See AM. CIVIL LIBERIES UNION supra note 10.
278
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creased likelihood of every person of Mexican origin living in
most of the densest cities in America being stopped by inimigration law enforcement. 2 80 The Court also inappropriately
considered the Mexican/Non-Mexican composition of the entire
population of these southern-border states, rather than the
Mexican/Non-Mexican composition of the population of the
counties affected by the 100-mile definition. Today for instance, according to statistics, the 100-mile "border zone" is
"home to 65.3 percent of the entire U.S. population, and
around 75 percent of the U.S. Hispanic population." 2 8 1 The
Court also blatantly ignored the fact that most counties located
within the "border zone" along the southern border have overwhelming percentages of Mexican population-effectively be2 8 2coming the majority of the population in these counties
and that the probative value of "apparent Mexican ancestry" for
28 3
illegal immigration was basically worthless.
Therefore, the Court's assertion that "apparent Mexican
ancestry" was a relevant factor in policing undocumented immigration that was supported by the population statistics in
the footnote in Brignoni-Poncewas plainly erroneous. Yet, this
assertion supported by misleading statistics was not the
Court's worst mistake in approving this ethnic classification,
but rather, how the ethnic classification was itself defined and
would be applied by individual immigration law enforcement
officers.
B.

Ludicrous Legal Definition

When the Court approved of the government's use of the
"apparent Mexican ancestry" factor in the reasonable suspicion
analysis, it cited to the following excerpt of the government's
reply brief in United States v. Ortiz to support its holding:
280 See Tanvi Misra, Inside the Massive U.S. 'BorderZone', CITY LAB (May 14,
2018), https: / /www.citylab.com/equity/2018 /05/who-lives-in-border-patrols100-mile-zone-probably-you-mapped/558275/ [http: //perma.cc/2WPF-ZAD4].
281
Id. However, people of Mexican origin are not the only ones at risk. Any
individual belonging to a minority group in the United States is at risk of being
stopped as an undocumented alien. See infra Part V.B.
Compare AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION supra note 10, with Race and Ethnicity
282
in Texas (Map of Race and Ethnicity by County in Texas-Hispanics),STAT. ATLAS,
https: / /statisticalatlas. corn/state/Texas/Race-and-Ethnicity [https://perma
.cc/S93R-BVTB] (depicting that the composition of the Hispanic population in
most, if not all, of the counties within the "border zone" in Texas consists of more

than 50%).
283 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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The Immigration and Naturalization Service has informed us
that experienced Border Patrol officers look for persons with
the characteristic appearance of Mexican residents, an appearance that distinguishes those persons from the
thousands of Mexican aliens who lawfully reside in this
country and the thousands of American citizens of Mexican
ancestry. Illegal Mexican entrants commonly appear thin,
their hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in a
characteristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in
full-cut and coarsely-woven material. Experience has shown
we are told, that illegal entrants may exhibit obvious nervousness or affect excessive nonchalance as they approach a
28 4
checkpoint.
With this excerpt, the government attempted to provide the
Court with some "guidelines" on how the immigration status of
people with Mexican origin is apparent to USBP officers based
on people's physical characteristics like body constitution,
roughness of hands, haircut, or style of dress. Evidently, it is
absurd to believe that any reasonable human being can distinguish who is unlawfully in the United States just by looking at
the person's physical appearance, even more so, at the person's
clothing, haircut, or hands. In fact, the government's "guidelines" seem to conjure the image of a poor rural laborer rather
than a person with Mexican ancestry-unmistakably, a remnant of the "Mexican brown" stereotype USBP used in its early
days. 2 8 5 Indeed, the government's argument that these "guidelines" were effective in identifying undocumented immigrants
breaks down by including a simple and obvious factor left out
from them: skin color.
For obvious reasons, the government did not include skin
color in its "guidelines" to avoid the inference that immigration
law enforcement officers were racially profiling people of Mexican origin and associating them with illegal immigration. Yet,
the "guidelines" achieve exactly that result because only someone with a darker skin tone fits the description in the "guidelines" in such a way to be suspected as an undocumented
immigrant. 28 6 If instead, people with light skin color and blue
284 Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 142, at *12- 13.
285 See LYrLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 10 ("[About 5'5" to 5'8", dark brown
hair, brown eyes, dark compleion ...
").
286 The USBP officers' application of the "Hispanic appearance" factor in their
decision to detain a suspected undocumented immigrant has evolved into something extremely different from these "guidelines," a factor that includes any apparent characteristic they tend to associate with Hispanics, including skin color.
See, e.g., Yardley, supra note 16 (describing how USBP has even stopped and
refused to let Cameron County Judge Gilberto Hinojosa board a plane to Houston
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eyes fit the description in the "guidelines,"-"appear thin, their
hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in a characteristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in full-cut and
coarsely-woven material"-they conjure the image of a white
farmer, and not an undocumented immigrant.
The term "apparent Mexican ancestry" itself is extremely
problematic because how exactly can someone's Mexican ancestry be apparent? Most people in Mexico or of Mexican descent are mestizos, "meaning they have a mixture of
2 8 7 As the popuindigenous, European, and African ancestry."
lation continues to grow, these ancestries mix even further to
the point that, to be able to illustrate the degree to which people in Mexico or of Mexican descent are different from each
other, "[ilmagine if people from Kansas and California were as
genetically distinct from each other as someone from Germany
is from someone from Japan."2 8 Clearly, if attempting to define "apparent Mexican ancestry" ends in utter failure, then
attempting to use "apparent Mexican ancestry" as a tool for
immigration law enforcement is a downright disaster.
To exacerbate this disaster further into a catastrophe,
through time, the term "apparent Mexican ancestry" evolved in
the courts into its current form: "Hispanic appearance." No
court in the country has ever provided any explanation on why
"apparent Mexican ancestry" evolved into "Mexican appearance," 28

9

2 90
and then to
later equated first to "Latin extraction,"

"Hispanic appearance."291 But this bizarre evolution of the
term can be traced back to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Brignoni-Ponce,where in the same footnote in which the Court
cited population statistics to support the approval of this ethnic classification, 2 9 2 the Court extended the boundaries of logic
until he stated his citizenship, and also stopped Federal District Court Judge
Filemon B. Vega with his entourage after a USBP officer mistook him for an
undocumented immigrant or a drug smuggler). It would be extremely absurd to
believe that any of these two judges: (1) appeared thin; (2) their hands were rough
and work-worn; (3) their haircut was characteristic; and (4) they were dressing in
full-cut and coarsely-woven material.
See Lizzie Wade, People from Mexico Show Stunning Amount of Genetic
287
2
Diversity, SCI. MAG. (Jun. 12, 2014), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/ 014/
06/people-mexico-show-stunning-amount-genetic-diversity [http://perma.cc/
CV9G-RCUY]. To complicate matters further, Mexico also has sixty-five different
indigenous ethnic groups, some "as different from each other as Europeans are
from East Asians." IdL
288

Id.

289
290
291
292

See
See
See
See

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 571 (1976).
United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
supra Section V.A.
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after it stated that "many of the 950,000 other persons of Spanish origin living in these border States... may have a physical
appearance similar to persons of Mexican origin."2 9 3 In other
words, the Court carelessly likened the physical appearance of
people of Spanish origin with those of Mexican origin. Following this logic, since the USBP "guidelines" stated that legal
status and Mexican ancestry are apparent to experienced officers because undocumented immigrants commonly "appear
thin, their hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in
a characteristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in
full-cut and coarsely-woven material[,]" 2 9 4 then legal status
and Spanish ancestry are also apparent to experienced officers
because of exactly the same factors. Such an outlandish conclusion cannot possibly stand.
Even today, the United States Census Bureau has not been
able to provide a clear definition of what Hispanic origin means:
"Hispanic origin can be viewed as the heritage, nationality,
lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before arriving in the United States ...
People who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may be any
race."2 9 5 Further, the United States Census Bureau uses a
code list containing "over 30 Hispanic or Latino subgroups" to
categorize people who identify as Hispanic according to their
national origin. 2 9 6 As explained above, if Mexican ancestry
alone-with its incredibly diverse makeup of mixed races and
ethnicities-cannot possibly be apparent, how can Hispanic
ancestry-a term that encompasses people of nearly twentyone different Spanish-speaking countries around the world, 2 9 7
each with their own unique mixture of ancestries coming from
all continents-be apparent? 2 98 If no training or experience
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886, n. 12 (1975).
See Reply Brief for the United States, supranote 142, at 12-13 (emphasis
added).
295
Hispanic or Latino Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/note/US/RHI725218 [https://perma.cc/DZ97-DBR4] (last visited Aug. 25, 2019).
296
Hispanic Origin,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/pop
ulation/hispanic-orlgln.html [http://perma.cc/75K6-EGJ2] (last visited Sept. 7,
2018).
297
See Niall Quinn, 21 Spanish Speaking Countries:From Largest to Smallest,
BASELANG,
https://baselang.com/blog/travel/spanish-speaking-countries/
[http://perma.cc/P7BJ-QGBA] (last visited Sept. 14, 2018).
298
For example, Just consider the makeup of mixed races and ethnicities from
Spain, from where the term "Hispanic" derives. Hispanic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https: //www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/Hispanic [http://perma.cc/
HQZ2-V6KL] ("[O]f or relating to the people, speech, or culture of Spain. .. ").
Spain has been conquered and settled by a mix of different civilizations through293
294

2019]
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can possibly enable someone to identify an individual's Hispanic ancestry by looking at skin tone or physical traits, how
could training or experience enable someone to identify an individual's Hispanic ancestry and whether the individual is legally in the United States by merely looking at physical
characteristics like body constitution, roughness of hands,
haircut, or style of dress?
Consequently, since the "Hispanic appearance" classification is such an indefinite concept, it is not a surprise that
immigration law enforcement officers are unable to apply the
classification objectively as required by the totality of the circumstances. As explained in Part II.A, the totality of the circumstances test constantly runs the risk of becoming
subjective because an individual officer's suspicion may be impacted by the officer's own bias or misperception-whether
conscious or unconscious-and not necessarily by enhanced
2 9 9 As
intuition obtained through police training or experience.
a result, USBP officers are likely to have their own interpretation of who may have a "Hispanic appearance" based on their
experiences not as law enforcement officers but as members of
society, experiences possibly affected by social stereotypes and
institutional practices. 30 0 Predictably, USBP officers mostly
stop people of minority groups because "Hispanic appearance"
is typically associated with people with a darker skin tone and
30 1 This permissinot with white, blonde, or blue-eyed people.
ble profiling should raise concern to populations of minority
groups around the country because 72% of the U.S. minority
population lives within the 100-mile border zone, and those
are
areas with the highest concentration of minority population
30 2
heaviest.
the
is
presence
USBP
where
areas
the same
out the centuries, from "Visigoths from northern Europe, the Phoenicians, Greeks
and Romans from the Mediterranean region[] and the Moors from northern Africa." Jaime Gonzalez, I'm White in Barcelona but in Los Angeles I'm Hispanic?,
PRI'S WORLD, Oct. 28, 2015, https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-10-28/im-whitebarcelona-los-angeles-im-hispanic [http://perma.cc/5B7H-D6G9]. These racial
and ethnic combinations in Spain alone cannot be apparent. Now consider that

those same racial and ethnic combinations in Spain were mixed further with the

different American indigenous ethnic groups. See id. ("ITIhere are also white
Hispanics, as well as black Hispanics or Asian Hispanics.").
299 See Flame, supra note 72, at 336.
300 See LYrTE HERNANDEZ, supranote 25, at 199-201.
See id. at 55-56; UNCOVERING USBP, supra note 15, at 17 ("The 1-44 data
301
shows that USBP's arrest practices affect lawfully present noncitizens from all

over the globe. The greatest impact, however, appears to be on noncitizens of

color. The vast majority of those wrongfully arrested were from South Asian, East
Asian, African, and Caribbean backgrounds.").
302 See Misra, supra note 280.
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Therefore, neither the "Hispanic appearance" classification, nor any of its previous formulations, can withstand strict
scrutiny. Policing the border for illegal immigration to further
national security might be a compelling government interest,
but the use of an individual's "Hispanic appearance" is clearly
not a narrowly tailored measure that furthers national security. The classification is enormously overbroad: USBP officers
are more likely to stop and question all people of Hispanic
origin-and of other minority groups for reasons explained
above-for their immigration status only because a few might
be undocumented immigrants. 3 0 3 The classification is also
enormously underinclusive: USBP officers are likely to ignore
and not stop people from other ethnicities and races not typically associated with illegal immigration. 3 0 4 USBP's own data
corroborates that the "Hispanic appearance" classification is
not even an effective tool to reduce illegal immigration:
Between 2008 and 2018, many, many more people with legal
status were taken into custody at the internal checkpointssome years, almost twice as many ....

During the same

period, apprehensions of people who are deportable dropped
by 50 percent ....
A 2017 Government Accountability Office . . . review of checkpoints requested by Congress also

found that arrests at these sites between 2013 and 2016
were a drop in the bucket-2 percent of total arrests of unauthorized entrants in that time. 30 5
CONCLUSION
In Brignoni-Ponce,the Supreme Court intended to reduce
the risk of arbitrary and abusive immigration investigatory
stops against people of Mexican origin, but paradoxically, it
ended up sanctioning the USBP's discriminatory practice of
enforcing immigration law enforcement by means of an individ303 Id. ("[Slome Arivaca residents started documenting [USBP's] interactions
with locals 1,] ... analyzed 2,000-plus interactions, and found that vehicles with
Latinos in them were 26 times more likely to be asked for ID than white motorists.
They were also 20 times more likely to be sent in for a secondary inspection.").
While it is true that USBP officers stop Hispanics more frequently for their immigration status, this fact is not an example of the classification's success or of the
USBP's accuracy in its application. The majority of illegal immigration policing
occurs in the counties of southern-border states in which, as stated above, Hispanics constitute the majority
of the population.
304 Almost half--450 /o-of undocumented immigrants are already in the United
States when they go into undocumented status, mostly by overstaying their visas.
The majority of this population is non-Hispanic. Kristin Connor, Updating
Brignoni-Ponce: A CriticalAnalysis of Race-Based Immigration Enforcement, 11
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 567, 587 (2008).
305 Misra, supranote 280.
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ual's ethnicity. Once the Supreme Court sanctioned the
USBP's ethnic profiling, the classification later evolved into its
current, more vague and imprecise form that correlated Hispanic origin with illegal immigration. Unsurprisingly, the government is now continuously suspicious of people of Hispanic
origin and constantly throws their citizenship into question.
Even after nearly seventy years since the legal doctrine of "separate, but equal" was abolished, the government still treats
people of Hispanic origin as second-class citizens because of
the outdated, extremely flawed, and stereotypical "Hispanic appearance" factor that is still enforced and alive today. Moreover, the term's imprecise and obfuscated definition, combined
with the broad subjectivity with which USBP applies it, puts
the populations of minority groups at risk of the same arbitrary
and abusive treatment.
No better example illustrates the insidiousness of the use
of the "Hispanic appearance" than the USBP immigration investigatory stops at the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoint. Before conducting these immigration investigatory stops
on travelers, USBP officers need reasonable suspicion. USBP
details at TSA checkpoints are not functional equivalents of the
border and do not fall under the border search exception because the dwellings of airports are neither international ports
of entry nor functional equivalents of the border-with the exception of the dwellings of airports where incoming international flights arrive after a nonstop flight from foreign country.
Furthermore, the presence of USBP details at the airport are
not domestic fixed checkpoints because, although their purpose is similar, core features of domestic fixed checkpoints that
characterize the immigration investigatory stops conducted
there are not present at the airport.
Hence, USBP officers conduct these immigration investigatory stops in a manner resembling or matching roving patrols,
and therefore, USBP officers must obtain sufficient objective
articulable facts that satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard
before conducting the stops. However, USBP officers cannot
possibly obtain sufficient reliable objective articulable facts
that amount to reasonable suspicion according to the Court's
standard in Brignoni-Poncebecause of the particular compulsory conditions present at the TSA checkpoints at these southern border airports. Moreover, none of these interactions
between USBP officers and travelers are objectively consensual
because whenever travelers enter a TSA checkpoint, they are
effectively "seized" under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly,
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USBP officers "free-ride" on the TSA checkpoint's compulsory
conditions when they interact with travelers to purposefully
elicit answers from them about their immigration status or to
obtain sufficient information from them to conduct a valid immigration investigatory stop, and therefore, travelers have no
option but to relent to the USBP officers' requests for fear of
legal consequences.
The Supreme Court must overrule the "Hispanic appearance" classification pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause
and hold that the USBP immigration investigatory stops at TSA
pre-boarding screening checkpoints in the southern border are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. These legal issues must raise great concern around the country because
nearly all major U.S. cities are within the "reasonable distance"
designation of 100 air miles of the border, and if the Trump
Administration one day decides to station USBP details in all of
those cities airports, the Fourth Amendment rights of millions
of U.S. citizens and legal aliens that are members of minority
groups will be violated on a daily basis.

